Earnings management has received considerable attention in the accounting literature, but the prior literature research results there are two opposing views from various angles, the existing literature is not able to clearly show that the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management. The monograph "Equity Concentration and Earnings Management Type Selection" by Doctor Yuan Tangmei has solved the puzzle problem "There are two opposing views in research area of equity governance affect earnings management in all cases." This paper describes the reform train of thought, research contents and research conclusions, main innovation, academic value of the monograph. The monograph research result is inconsistent with any previous common view that equity concentration affect earnings management, but not opposite to the before view, it give a new explanation from another angle for a variety of equity concentration focus on the uncertainty of the impact of earnings management. These results of the monograph study breakthrough some of the research results of this research field, it may shed a new light on the effect of equity concentration on earnings management, and has extended meaning.
In this paper, we examine firms' use of the Internet to enhance the relevance of their financial reporting. We define a firm as practicing Internet Financial Reporting (IFR) when it provides in its web site either (1) a comprehensive set of financial statements (including footnotes and the auditors' report), (2) a link to its annual report elsewhere on the Internet or (3) a link to the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. While 70 percent of the firms in our sample engage in IFR, we find substantial variation in the quality of firms' IFR practices. Specifically, the variations in quality pertain to the timeliness and therefore, the usefulness of firms' financial reporting on the Internet. We find that some firms provide more timely financial disclosures via the Internet (e.g., monthly sales) while other firms report outdated financial data (e.g., two-year old annual reports). We also observe that the usefulness of firms' financial reporting on the Internet depends on how easy it is to access that data, the amount of data disclosed and/or whether users can download or analyze the data. To substantiate firms' incentives for engaging in IFR, we sent surveys to firms with web sites in our sample and asked them to report their perceived costs and benefits related to establishing an Internet presence. Firms responded to our questions about why they established an Internet presence by indicating that they perceive their web sites to be an important vehicle to disseminate information to shareholders. After documenting how and why firms use the Internet to voluntarily disclose financial information, we develop the implications of such practices for consumers who demand financial information, firms that supply financial data, auditors and market regulators.
This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives—arising from stock-based compensation and stock ownership—and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993–2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.
We examine the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry. By focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, we provide evidence on the impact of regulation on earnings management arising from chief executive officers’ equity incentives. We find that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimums required by regulators. This finding indicates that, in the banking industry, potential regulatory intervention induces, rather than mitigates, earnings management arising from equity incentives.
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