THIS FILE DETAILS THE EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOLS used in running the experiment. This includes the instructions, the quiz, and a screenshot of an example game. This file also contains the experimental data which include the actions played by each subject in the 8 games, the treatment, and their classified order of rationality. APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOLSBelow is the set of instructions for the robustness treatment. The instructions for the main treatment were identical except that there was no mention of the random ordering. Instructions were available to all subjects and displayed on their computer screens, as well as read aloud by the experimenter.

We study the effect of embedding pairwise choices between lotteries within a choice list on measured risk attitude. Using an experiment with online workers, we find that subjects choose the risky lottery rather than a sure payment significantly more often when responding to a choice list. This behavior can be rationalized by the interaction between nonexpected utility and the random incentive system, as suggested by Karni and Safra (1987).

This paper provides the first unified explanation of behavior in coordinated attack games under both public and private information. It demonstrates that the main experimental results, such as threshold strategies, comparative statics, and the differences in behavior under public and private information, are robust predictions of limited depth of reasoning models. This is in contrast to equilibrium, which mispredicts the coordinating roles of public and private information. The analysis has implications for understanding macroeconomic phenomena, like currency attacks and debt crises, which are commonly modeled using incomplete information coordinated attack games.

Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole.