Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: We investigate the impact of family equity holdings on three indicators of corporate social responsibility: environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rankings. We further evaluate how firm governance mediates the effect of family ownership on environmental and social improvements and how national governance systems influence the response of family holdings to ESG. Research Findings/Insights: Based on a sample of 23,902 firm-year observations drawn from 2002 to 2012 covering 46 countries and 3,893 firms, our findings show that both closely held equity and family ownership are negatively associated with ESG performance. When we control for governance, closely held equity is no longer associated with environmental and social rankings, but family ownership retains a significant negative association. These results are strong and consistent across liberal market economies (LME), whereas coordinated market economies (CME) exhibit generally weaker results and considerable diversity. Japan stands out as different from the other countries examined in depth. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results are consistent with agency relationships driving decisions concerning ESG commitment in LMEs. They also emphasize the role of institutional differences given the weak and variable association between ownership and ESG in CMEs. We show that families may be able to influence decisions, possibly through participation in management, despite normally effective governance constraints. As the impact of ownership and governance varies across economies and ownership type, this implies that both agency and governance should be evaluated in the context of the economic environment. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results offer insights to regulators and policy makers who intend to improve ESG performance. The results suggest that encouraging diversified ownership is particularly important in LMEs, that improvements in governance may benefit social and environmental performance where equity is closely held by institutions, but that governance may be less effective in the presence of family ownership.

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study investigates the impact of a responsible investment index on environmental management practices. Firms that were included in the FTSE4Good index but failed to meet enhanced requirements were subject to both engagement by FTSE and the threat of expulsion from the index. We examine the combined effect of these actions, estimate the contribution of both elements separately, and the influence of concentrated equity ownership, corporate governance, and the institutional environment. We also evaluate whether the effect is persistent or transitory. Research Findings/Insights: For a sample of 1,029 firms from 21 countries, our findings demonstrate that engagement combined with the threat of expulsion from the FTSE4Good index doubles the probability that a firm failing to meet the environmental management criteria in 2002 would comply by 2005. The higher compliance rate for the firms receiving engagement persists until the end of our study in 2010. We also find that compliance is positively associated with low levels of concentrated ownership and with firms based in coordinated rather than liberal market economies. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results contribute to the understanding of the complexities of governance, where decision makers are constrained or influenced by equity holders, the firm's governance system, institutional arrangements, and collective engagement by institutional equity holders. Our findings are consistent with both institutional and agency issues impacting on decision making. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study suggests that engagement via a responsible investment index reinforced by the threat of public expulsion from the index provides an effective route for large-scale collaborative investor engagement on corporate social responsibility issues targeting large and internationally diverse firms. It also demonstrates why regulators may wish to encourage engagement of this type to achieve social benefits.

Using a large sample of 3,541 companies drawn from 30 countries over the period 2002 to 2010 we analyse the impact of strategic shareholdings on different elements of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that total strategic or closely held equity holdings adversely affect the environmental, social and governance scores provided by ASSET4. However, this effect is largely driven by entrenched and undiversified holdings such as family and corporate cross-holdings whereas diversified institutional investments typically have an insignificant impact. The influence of undiversified holdings includes particularly strong negative impacts on measures that include climate change, environmental management, business ethics and human rights. Thus the impact of ownership on CSR performance differs depending on both the type of owner and the type of CSR.

Using a large sample of 3,541 companies drawn from 30 countries over the period 2002 to 2010 we analyse the impact of strategic shareholdings on different elements of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that total strategic or closely held equity holdings adversely affect the environmental, social and governance scores provided by ASSET4. However, this effect is largely driven by entrenched and undiversified holdings such as family and corporate cross-holdings whereas diversified institutional investments typically have an insignificant impact. The influence of undiversified holdings includes particularly strong negative impacts on measures that include climate change, environmental management, business ethics and human rights. Thus the impact of ownership on CSR performance differs depending on both the type of owner and the type of CSR.

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