The purpose of this paper is to offer a working de®nition of social exclusion and to operationalize it in such a way that an initial empirical analysis of social exclusion in Britain today can be undertaken. After a brief review of conceptions of social exclusion and some of the key controversies, we operationalize one de®nition based on the notion of participation in ®ve types of activityÐconsumption, savings, production, political and social. Using the British Household Panel Survey, indicators for participation on these dimensions are developed and analysed both cross-sectionally and longitudinally for the period 1991±5. We ®nd strong associations between an individual's participation (or lack of it) on the ®ve different dimensions, and on each dimension over time. However, there is no distinct group of socially excluded individuals: few are excluded on all dimensions in any one year and even fewer experience multiple exclusion for the whole period. The results support the view that treating different dimensions of exclusion separately is preferable to thinking about social exclusion in terms of one homogeneous group.

Equivalization of incomes for household composition is accepted practice when measuring poverty but other variations in needs are rarely acknowledged. This paper uses data from two U.K. household surveys to quantify the extra costs of living associated with disability. The extra costs of disability are derived by comparing the "standard of living" of households with and without disabled members at a given income, having controlled for other sources of variation. Logit and ordered logit regressions are used to estimate the relationship between a range of standard of living indicators, income, and disability. The extra costs of disability derived are substantial and rise with severity of disability. Unadjusted incomes significantly understate the problem of low income amongst disabled people, and thereby in the population as a whole. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

This article seeks to illuminate the complementarity between the capabilities framework, developed by Amartya Sen and others, and the social model of disability. Common themes include the relationship between social barriers and individual limitations, the importance of autonomy and the value of freedom, and dissatisfaction with income as a measure of well-being. Bringing the two approaches together has implications for analysis (for example in identifying poverty or disadvantage), and for policy, which are briefly illustrated. The article concludes that the capabilities framework provides a more general theoretical framework in which to locate the social model of disability, without compromising any of its central tenets; and the social model provides a thorough-going application of the capabilities framework. Each can benefit from exposure to the other.

The National Institute for Health Research Health Technology Assessment programme.

This article examines a new capability‐based measurement framework that has been developed as a basis for equality and human rights monitoring in twenty‐first‐century Britain. We explore the conceptual foundations of the framework and demonstrate its practical application for the purposes of monitoring equality (in terms of the distribution of substantive freedoms and opportunities among individuals and groups) and human rights (in terms of the achievement of substantive freedoms and opportunities below a minimum threshold) in England, Scotland and Wales. The article challenges the sceptical position by suggesting that ‘operationalizing’ the capability approach is both ‘feasible’ and ‘workable’. A new two‐stage procedure for deriving a capability list is proposed. This combines human rights and deliberative consultation and strikes a balance, we contend, between internationally recognized human rights standards and principles on the one hand, and direct deliberation/participation on the other, in the development and agreement of capability lists.Capabilities, Functionings, Treatment, Autonomy, Equality, Human rights, Indicator,

adaptation, income, panel data, satisfaction, subjective well-being,

The purpose of deliberation as a research technique (as opposed to policymaking or public consultation) is distinctive: to uncover the public’s informed, considered and collective view on a normative question. Such questions often arise in relation to research on poverty and inequality, where there is a need to justify the thresholds and concepts adopted on a deeper basis than convention alone can offer. But can deliberative research provide the answer, and if so in what circumstances? By comparing deliberative research to more traditional methods, such as in-depth interviewing, attitudinal surveys, ethnography and participatory approaches, this article reveals that deliberative designs involve a number of assumptions, including a strong fact/value distinction, an emphasis on ‘outsider’ expertise and a view of participants as essentially similar to each other rather than defined by socio-demographic differences. Using an example of deliberative research in which the author was involved, developing a list of ‘capabilities’ for monitoring inequalities in Britain, it also demonstrates that normative decisions permeate the design and implementation of deliberative research in practice. Thus, while deliberative research has the potential to provide uniquely considered, insightful and well-justified answers to the problem of defining a collective position on key questions in social science, it is currently under-theorised as an approach, and transparency at all stages of the process is essential to avoid the charge of simply reflecting the researchers’ implicit values.

'Agency goals' play an important role in Sen's capability approach. They are an acknowledgement that individuals aspire to achieve objectives other than their own immediate well-being. This article argues that using agency goal achievement as a basis for evaluating inequality or disadvantage is problematic. In particular, one of the principal charges against utilitarianism made by capability theorists — that based on adaptation or conditioned expectations — can be made with equal force and validity against a metric based on agency goals. The argument is illustrated using survey data on the educational and occupational aspirations of a cohort of young people in Britain. The article concludes that the conventional cross-sectional, objective, definition of a capability set needs to be broadened. Only if the capability set from which agency goals are formed and the capability set within which they are pursued are evaluated can we begin to properly assess substantive freedom.Capability sets, Agency goals, Conditioned expectations, Adaptation, Aspirations, Autonomy,