We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed price-setting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payoff equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves. Hence, it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists.
Abstract. Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why "smarter" people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phanomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.
In a less widely known contribution, Béla Martos (1966, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) introduced a generalized notion of concavity that is closely related to what is nowadays known as r-concavity in the operations research literature, and that is identical to what is nowadays known as ρ-concavity in the economics literature. The present paper aims at making the original contribution accessible to a wider audience and illustrating its importance from a modern perspective. To this end, we offer a translation of those parts of Martos (1966) that are directly related to generalized concavity. Reviewing the virtues of r-concavity and ρ-concavity, we find a surprisingly short proof of the univariate Prékopa-Borell theorem. We also survey a number of applications of the considered concepts in operations research and economics.
The study of multipath communication technologies is a hot research area today. One natural effect of using multipath communication instead of the single path one is the higher throughput value which will result in a better performance, not only in the usual Internet communication, but also in Big Data centers where the communication infrastructure can appear as a bottleneck point of the system. In this paper, we introduce a new game theoretical model for the evaluation of multiuser-multipath communication technologies. The decision problem for the users (i.e. network clients) is studied in a multipath communication system. We develop a game theoretical model for client payoff maximization, where the decision variables for each client are defined as their path requests. Due to limited hardware performance and limited service capacity, we assume that each client's payoff depends on other clients' path requests. We apply the tools of game theory to describe equilibrium behavior of the clients in the given interaction situation. By providing two examples, we show that our model is suitable for measuring payoffs, both in money and in throughput. We also offer possible directions for the further development of our model.
Several behavioral game theory models aim at explaining why "smarter" people win more frequently in simultaneous zero-sum games, a phenomenon, which is not explained by the Nash equilibrium concept. This type game theoretic models can be applied also in infocommunication problems. We use a computational model and a numerical simulation based on Markov chains to describe player behavior and predict payoffs.
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