Humans tend to be conservative and typically will retain their initial decision even if an option to change is provided. We investigated whether the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN), an event-related potential associated with the affective-motivational anticipation of feedback in gambling tasks, represents the strong response tendency to retain an initial decision. We compared SPNs in three different card-gambling tasks wherein the participants were given the opportunity to change their initial decision after they chose one of three cards. In two of these tasks, the winning probability was equiprobable (1/3 and 1/2, respectively) whether or not the participants changed their initial decision. However, in the Monty Hall dilemma task, changing the initial decision stochastically doubled the probability of winning (2/3) compared with retaining (1/3). In this counterintuitive probabilistic dilemma task, after the participant chose an option among three cards, a nonreward (losing) option is revealed. Then, the participants are offered a chance to change their mind and asked to make their final decision: to retain their initial choice or change to the alternate option. In all tasks, maintenance of previous behaviors was observed, although the rate of retaining earlier choices tended to be lower in the Monty Hall dilemma task than in the other two tasks. The SPNs were larger on retain trials than on change trials irrespective of task. These results suggest that underlying brain activities associated with the strong tendency to retain the initial decision can be observed by the SPN and thus it reflects expectancy of outcomes in terms of self-chosen behaviors.

If you know that you are the author of a freely chosen action and that you bear responsibility for its outcome, then you are said to have “a sense of agency.” When there is a delay between action and outcome, this response must be remembered if you are to learn from the experience. Previous studies have shown that the Stimulus‐Preceding Negativity (SPN) recorded during the delay interval is larger under conditions that foster a sense of agency. In an EEG experiment (N = 27), we confirmed that the SPN is larger when participants have a choice between two responses in a gambling task as compared to when there is only a single button and the computer determines the monetary outcome. This SPN agency effect was largest over right prefrontal cortex and it did not vary significantly between trial blocks in which only gains or only losses were possible. Participants in a second experiment (N = 26) performed the same task while activity in anterior insular cortex, a known SPN generator, was measured via functional magnetic resonance image (fMRI). An essentially identical pattern of results was obtained: Activity was greater on choice than no‐choice trials, especially for the right hemisphere, and no effect of contextual valence was observed. Although parallel observations such as these cannot warrant causal inference, our findings are consistent with the assumption that anterior insular cortex contributes to the effect of agency on the SPN.

Purpose Interoception is a sense of the physiological state of one’s body. Interoception that is generated by processing physiological information in the insular cortex plays an important role in achieving optimal performance in competitive sports. This study aimed to reveal the difference in interoceptive ability between long-distance runners and sprinters and its neural correlates by recording the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) that is generated from the insular cortex. Based on previous findings, we predicted that long-distance runners would show better interoceptive ability and larger SPNs compared with sprinters. Method We used a questionnaire and a heartbeat counting task to evaluate the interoceptive sensitivity and accuracy, respectively, of both long-distance runners and sprinters. We recorded SPNs during the execution of a time estimation task where participants estimate 3 s by pressing a button. Results Results of the questionnaire revealed that sprinters exhibited a higher interoceptive ability associated with attention control of their own bodies than did long-distance runners. Sprinters also showed a larger SPN over the left centroparietal regions compared with long-distance runners. Conclusion In contrast to our prediction, sprinters exhibited a superior interoceptive ability and a greater activity of the insular cortex relative to long-distance runners. These results suggest that sprinters might be more susceptible to their internal bodily signals compared with long-distance runners, exhibiting greater activation of the anterior insula.

The Monty Hall Dilemma (MHD) poses a counterintuitive probabilistic problem to the players of this game. In the MHD task, a participant chooses one of three options where only one contains a reward. After one of the unchosen options (always no reward) is disclosed, the participant is asked to make a final decision: either change to the remaining option or stick with their first choice. Although the probability of winning if they change is higher (2/3) compared to sticking with their first choice (1/3), most people stick with their original selection and often lose. In accordance with previous research, repetitive exposure to the MHD task increases the change behavior without any obvious understanding of the mathematical reasons why changing increases their chance of being rewarded. We recorded the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN), an ERP that might reflect the informative value of the feedback. In the second half of the task, feedback was predicted to be less informative because learning had taken place. Indeed, the SPN amplitude became smaller over the frontal region. Also, the SPN amplitude was larger for change than for stick trials. These results suggest that learning in the MHD might be manifest in affective-motivational anticipation as indicated by the SPN. K E Y W O R D Saffective-motivational process, counterintuitive, Monty Hall Dilemma, stimulus-preceding negativity