BackgroundIndia is a country with vast unmet medical needs. eHealth has the potential to improve the quality of health care and reach the unreached. We have sought to understand the kinds of eHealth programmes being offered in India today, the challenges they face and the nature of their financing.MethodsWe have adopted an interview-based methodology. The 30 interviews represent 28 organizations, and include designers, implementers, evaluators and technology providers for eHealth programmes.ResultsA range of programmes is being run, including point-of-care in rural and urban areas, treatment compliance, data collection and disease surveillance, and distant medical education. Most programmes provide point-of-care to patients or other beneficiaries in rural areas. Technology is not a limiting factor but the unavailability of suitable health personnel is a major challenge, especially in rural areas. We have identified a few factors that help this situation. Financial sustainability is also a concern for most programmes, which have rarely been scaled up. There are recent for-profit efforts in urban areas, but no reliable business model has been identified yet. Government facilities have not been very effective in eHealth on their own, but collaborations between the government and non-profit (in particular) and for-profit organisations have led to impactful programmes.ConclusionsIt is unlikely that eHealth will have widespread and sustainable impact without government involvement, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless, programmes run solely by the government are unlikely to be the most effective.
Serological tests for tuberculosis are inaccurate and WHO has recommended against their use. Although not used by the Revised National TB Control Programme (RNTCP), serodiagnostics are widely used in the private sector in India. A root-cause analysis was undertaken to determine why serological tests are so popular, and seven root causes were identified that can be grouped into three categories: technical/medical, economic, and regulatory. Technical/medical: RNTCP's current low budget does not allow scale-up of the newer, WHO-endorsed technologies. Thus, under the RNTCP, most patients have access to only smear microscopy, a test that is insensitive and underused in the private sector. Because there is no accurate, validated, point-of-care test for TB, serological tests meet a perceived need among doctors and patients. Economic: While imported molecular or liquid culture tests are too expensive, there are no affordable Indian versions on the market, leaving serological tests as the main alternative. Although serological tests are inaccurate, various players along the value chain profit from their use, and this sustains a market for these tests. Regulatory: TB tests are poorly regulated and a large number of serological kits are on the market. Private healthcare in general is poorly regulated, and doctors in the private sector are outside the scope of RNTCP and do not necessarily follow standard guidelines. A clear understanding of these realities should facilitate market-based strategies that can help replace serological tests with accurate, validated tools.
BackgroundMarket Access Agreements (MAA) between pharmaceutical industry and health care payers have been proliferating in Europe in the last years. MAA can be simple discounts from the list price or very sophisticated schemes with inarguably high administrative burden.DiscussionWe distinguished and defined from the health care payer perspective three kinds of MAA: Commercial Agreements (CA), Payment for Performance Agreements (P4P) and Coverage with Evidence Development (CED). Apart from CA, the agreements assumed collection and analysis of real-life health outcomes data, either from a cohort of patients (CED) or on per patient basis (P4P). We argue that while P4P aim at reducing drug cost to payers without a systematic approach to addressing uncertainty about drugs' value, CED were implemented provisionally to reduce payer's uncertainty about value of a medicine within a defined time period.SummaryWe are of opinion that while CA and P4P have a potential to reduce payers' expenditure on costly drugs while maintaining a high list price, CED address initial uncertainty related to assessing the real-life value of new drugs and enable a final HTA recommendation or reimbursement and pricing decisions. Further, we suggest that real cost to health care payers of drugs in CA and P4P should be made publicly available in a systematic manner, to avoid a perverse impact of these MAA types on the international reference pricing system.
Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2010, sipuleucel-T (Provenge(®)) was the first 'personalized' cancer vaccine for the treatment of prostate cancer in a metastatic, non-symptomatic population of 30,000 men in the USA. Sipuleucel-T is prepared individually for each patient and infused in three sessions over a period of 1 month. However, in 2015, Dendreon, the owner of sipuleucel-T, filed for bankruptcy. This opinion paper reviews the probable reasons this innovative product failed to achieve commercial success. PubMed and internet searches were performed focused on pricing, reimbursement, and market access. We found that sipuleucel-T's FDA approval was delayed by 3 years, reportedly because of the vaccine's new mechanism of action. Sipuleucel-T was cleared by the European Medicines Agency 2 years later, but other national agencies were not approached. It was priced at $US93,000 for a course of treatment, and this high price combined with the company's late securement of reimbursement for the vaccine by the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) resulted in another year's delay in accessing the market. Despite a positive recommendation by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network, sipuleucel-T's complex administration, high price, and uncertainty about the reimbursement status deterred doctors from prescribing the product. Furthermore, the vaccine's supply was limited during the first year of launch due to limited manufacturing capacity. In addition, two oral metastatic prostate cancer drugs with similar survival benefits reached the US market 1 and 2 years after sipuleucel-T. Also, even though Dendreon's market capitalization topped $US7.5 billion following the FDA's approval of sipuleucel-T, this value degraded gradually until the firm's bankruptcy 5 years later. We conclude that the bankruptcy of Dendreon was largely due to the delay in securing FDA approval and CMS coverage, as well as the high cost that had to be incurred by providers up-front. Licensing sipuleucel-T to a pharmaceutical company more experienced in the market access pathway may have saved the company and the product.
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