This paper presents the results of a survey carried out in 2017. The research was focused on the behaviour of Polish local and regional formal institutions (L.G.U.s) in support of the development of local and regional entrepreneurship. The main aim was to determine which institutions are crucial for the support of the development of entrepreneurship, but, more importantly, to find why some L.G.U.s obeyed the rules of the entrepreneurship game even if the state monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were lacking. Statistical tools of correlation analysis and factor analysis were used in the research. The factor analysis added empirical evidence on the discussion on how L.G.U.s may affect development of entrepreneurship. Based on the statistically processed data obtained from research, the authors came to the conclusion that geographic location, political power, level of unemployment, size of the territory or level of debt had no impact on the behaviour of L.G.U.s in their support of the development of entrepreneurship. What mattered for the support of entrepreneurship by L.G.U.s was the model of management, type of L.G.U., and the number of enterprises within the territory governed by L.G.U.s. Moreover, only provinces fully succeeded in supporting the development of entrepreneurship, while rural municipalities failed.

Purpose: The objective of this paper is to propose the new indicator of bankruptcy law severity for debtors (BLSI-Bankruptcy Law Severity Index). On the basis of this index we conducted comparative analysis of debtor/creditor friendliness of bankruptcy laws among 27 selected countries. Design/Methodology/Approach: In the research the following methods were used: analysis of legal acts, literature review and expert method. Findings: The empirical results show that the most debtor-friendly bankruptcy and restructuring laws are those of the USA, Ireland and Canada. At the opposite pole were Slovenia, Australia and Austria. It can also be noted that many EU countries have a similar level of BLSI measure, which is most likely a consequence of harmonisation activities undertaken within the Community. Practical Implications: The conducted research enables us to propose the direction of changes in bankruptcy and restructuring laws in the next stage. Originality/value: On the basis of proposed BLSI, we will be able to examine the relationship between the severity of bankruptcy law and innovation, entrepreneurship and the level of development of financial markets in the studied countries.

A debt does not function as a liquid asset in an ineffective enforcement environment. In this study, we investigated the efficiency of creditor protection in insolvency. We approached efficiency in three dimensions: ex ante, ex post, and interim. This paper presents the differences between Polish and Spanish ex ante efficiency, the factors influencing the interim recovery rate and efficiency, and the differences between ex ante and ex post efficiency in Polish proceedings. We studied 17,494 financial statements of Polish companies and the finalized proceedings of 784 court cases from the period 2004-2012. We applied regression analysis, combined with classification and robustness tests. Our evidence supports the conclusion that Polish insolvency proceedings are inefficient. The interim efficiency oscillates at 12% per annum. The duration of the proceeding from filing until resolution takes an average of 853 days. These results have policy implications, as creditor protection is a major aspect in attracting investment for net foreign debtors.

The aim of this article is to supplement the Law and Economics area of science with regard to the scope of the ex ante effectiveness of bankruptcy law using the example of Poland. Bankruptcy law is effective in the ex ante stage when it eliminates from the market insolvent entrepreneurs who cannot even afford to cover the costs of bankruptcy proceedings. In these cases, the bankruptcy court should dismiss the petition for bankruptcy because of “poverty” of the insolvent estate. As a result, the insolvent debtor should be liquidated and deleted from the register of companies. This paper investigates entities whose bankruptcy petition has been rejected due to “poverty” of the insolvent estate. The study shows that, after the filing has been dismissed, the majority of these entities are not liquidated. To determine who is responsible for this state of affairs, the article identifies the stakeholders at the time that applications are filed for bankruptcy proceedings and also after the bankruptcy petition has been rejected. The article highlights stakeholders' diverging interests, strengths, and weaknesses to assess their potential impact on bankruptcy procedures that should be dismissed due to “poverty” of the insolvent estate.