New indices of fiscal rule strength are constructed and, using a dynamic panel econometric model for 27 EU countries over the period 1990-2012, we assess whether national fiscal rules alone help to promote sustainable public finances in the EU or whether they must be supported by good governance in order to be effective. We find that fiscal rules are effective in reducing structural primary deficits at all levels of government efficiency. However, the effect is smaller as government efficiency increases, indicating that fiscal rules and government efficiency are institutional substitutes in terms of promoting fiscal sustainability. We also find that balanced budget rules are the most effective form of fiscal rules. Multiple fiscal rules are found to enhance fiscal solvency. Other institutional features that enhance the effectiveness of fiscal rules are transparency of policies and commitment to implementation of fiscal programs. Supranational rules, however, do not affect the effectiveness of national fiscal rules in reducing the deficit bias. Our results are robust to alternative estimation methods and endogeneity assumptions.

Under existing welfare arrangements, an increase in life expectancy may pose a serious threat to fiscal sustainability, and it may have dramatic effects on the intergenerational distribution of welfare. This paper finds that such effects may be countered through a policy which links the retirement age to changes in life expectancy.

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

This paper studies human-capital formation, labor-supply, and retirement decisions associated with four alternative regimes of social security. We implement a theoretical model with overlapping generations of households and two different ability types within each generation. We find that with a given social security contribution rate, it is better to transfer income to the elderly as old-age benefits, paid independently of labor-market status. This holds with both Bismarckian and Beveridgean benefits. With sufficiently small ability differences, a Bismarckian system of old-age benefits is likely to offer the highest level of utility to all citizens.