We investigate how diversity in individual responses to unwanted interactions affects the evolution of cooperation modeled as a 2-person prisoner's dilemma. We combine adaptive networks and evolutionary game theory, showing analytically how the coevolution of social dynamics, network dynamics, and behavioral differences benefit the entire community even though myopic individuals still act in their own interest. As defectors are wiped out, surviving cooperators maintain the full diversity of behavioral types, establishing cooperation as a robust evolutionary strategy. The present framework can be used in other problems where the feedback between topology and dynamics affects the overall behavior of the system.

BACKGROUND: There is variability in the cancer phenotype across individuals: two patients with the same tumour may experience different disease life histories, resulting from genetic variation within the tumour and from the interaction between tumour and host. Until now, phenotypic variability has precluded a clear-cut identification of the fundamental characteristics of a given tumour type. METHODS: Using multiple myeloma as an example, we apply the principles of evolutionary game theory to determine the fundamental characteristics that define the phenotypic variability of a tumour. RESULTS: Tumour dynamics is determined by the frequency-dependent fitness of different cell populations, resulting from the benefits and costs accrued by each cell type in the presence of others. Our study shows how the phenotypic variability in multiple myeloma bone disease can be understood through the theoretical approach of a game that allows the identification of key genotypic features in a tumour and provides a natural explanation for phenotypic variability. This analysis also illustrates how complex biochemical signals can be translated into cell fitness that determines disease dynamics. CONCLUSION: The present paradigm is general and extends well beyond multiple myeloma, and even to non-neoplastic disorders. Furthermore, it provides a new perspective in dealing with cancer eradication. Instead of trying to kill all cancer cells, therapies should aim at reducing the fitness of malignant cells compared with normal cells, allowing natural selection to eradicate the tumour.

Often groups need to meet repeatedly before a decision is reached. Hence, most individual decisions will be contingent on decisions taken previously by others. In particular, the decision to cooperate or not will depend on one's own assessment of what constitutes a fair group outcome. Making use of a repeated N-person prisoner's dilemma, we show that reciprocation towards groups opens a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive, leading populations to engage in dynamics involving both coordination and coexistence, and characterized by cycles of cooperation and defection. Furthermore, we show that this process leads to the emergence of fairness, whose level will depend on the dilemma at stake.

Human societies are organized in complex webs that are constantly reshaped by a social dynamic which is influenced by the information individuals have about others. Similarly, epidemic spreading may be affected by local information that makes individuals aware of the health status of their social contacts, allowing them to avoid contact with those infected and to remain in touch with the healthy. Here we study disease dynamics in finite populations in which infection occurs along the links of a dynamical contact network whose reshaping may be biased based on each individual's health status. We adopt some of the most widely used epidemiological models, investigating the impact of the reshaping of the contact network on the disease dynamics. We derive analytical results in the limit where network reshaping occurs much faster than disease spreading and demonstrate numerically that this limit extends to a much wider range of time scales than one might anticipate. Specifically, we show that from a population-level description, disease propagation in a quickly adapting network can be formulated equivalently as disease spreading on a well-mixed population but with a rescaled infectiousness. We find that for all models studied here – SI, SIS and SIR – the effective infectiousness of a disease depends on the population size, the number of infected in the population, and the capacity of healthy individuals to sever contacts with the infected. Importantly, we indicate how the use of available information hinders disease progression, either by reducing the average time required to eradicate a disease (in case recovery is possible), or by increasing the average time needed for a disease to spread to the entire population (in case recovery or immunity is impossible).