Human experience takes place in the line of mental time (MT) created through 'self-projection' of oneself to different time-points in the past or future. Here we manipulated self-projection in MT not only with respect to one's life events but also with respect to one's faces from different past and future time-points. Behavioural and event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging activity showed three independent effects characterized by (i) similarity between past recollection and future imagination, (ii) facilitation of judgements related to the future as compared with the past, and (iii) facilitation of judgements related to time-points distant from the present. These effects were found with respect to faces and events, and also suggest that brain mechanisms of MT are independent of whether actual life episodes have to be re-experienced or pre-experienced, recruiting a common cerebral network including the anteromedial temporal, posterior parietal, inferior frontal, temporo-parietal and insular cortices. These behavioural and neural data suggest that self-projection in time is a fundamental aspect of MT, relying on neural structures encoding memory, mental imagery and self.

The role of neurons in the substantia nigra (SN) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain in contributing to the elicitation of reward prediction errors during appetitive learning has been well established. Less is known about the differential contribution of these midbrain regions to appetitive versus aversive learning, especially in humans. Here we scanned human participants with high-resolution fMRI focused on the SN and VTA while they participated in a sequential Pavlovian conditioning paradigm involving an appetitive outcome (a pleasant juice), as well as an aversive outcome (an unpleasant bitter and salty flavor). We found a degree of regional specialization within the SN: Whereas a region of ventromedial SN correlated with a temporal difference reward prediction error during appetitive Pavlovian learning, a dorsolateral area correlated instead with an aversive expected value signal in response to the most distal cue, and to a reward prediction error in response to the most proximal cue to the aversive outcome. Furthermore, participants' affective reactions to both the appetitive and aversive conditioned stimuli more than 1 year after the fMRI experiment was conducted correlated with activation in the ventromedial and dorsolateral SN obtained during the experiment, respectively. These findings suggest that, whereas the human ventromedial SN contributes to long-term learning about rewards, the dorsolateral SN may be particularly important for long-term learning in aversive contexts.

Prominent accounts of Pavlovian conditioning successfully approximate the frequency and intensity of conditioned responses under the assumption that learning is exclusively model-free; that animals do not develop a cognitive map of events. However, these model-free approximations fall short of comprehensively capturing learning and behavior in Pavlovian conditioning. We therefore performed multivoxel pattern analysis of high-resolution functional MRI data in human participants to test for the encoding of stimulus-stimulus associations that could support model-based computations during Pavlovian conditioning. We found that dissociable sub-regions of the striatum encode predictions of stimulus-stimulus associations and predictive value, in a manner that is directly related to learning performance. Activity patterns in the orbitofrontal cortex were also found to be related to stimulus-stimulus as well as value encoding. These results suggest that the brain encodes model-based representations during Pavlovian conditioning, and that these representations are utilized in the service of behavior.

In inverse reinforcement learning an observer infers the reward distribution available for actions in the environment solely through observing the actions implemented by another agent. To address whether this computational process is implemented in the human brain, participants underwent fMRI while learning about slot machines yielding hidden preferred and non-preferred food outcomes with varying probabilities, through observing the repeated slot choices of agents with similar and dissimilar food preferences. Using formal model comparison, we found that participants implemented inverse RL as opposed to a simple imitation strategy, in which the actions of the other agent are copied instead of inferring the underlying reward structure of the decision problem. Our computational fMRI analysis revealed that anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex encoded inferences about action-values within the value space of the agent as opposed to that of the observer, demonstrating that inverse RL is an abstract cognitive process divorceable from the values and concerns of the observer him/herself.

Background: Patients with psychogenic amnesia generally suffer from episodic memory deficits associated with an impairment of self-identity. While the first is generally attributed to limbic dysfunction, the latter might be related to posterior parietal cortex. Methods and Results: In a patient with acute repetitive psychogenic amnesia, three different functional investigations (fMRI, electrical-neuroimaging, PET) during both resting-state and a behavioural paradigm testing Ôtime-travelÕ showed left posterior parietal activation, unlike in 12 control subjects. Conclusion: Impairment of self-identity and episodic memory in psychogenic amnesia may be associated with functional alterations of left posterior parietal cortex.

In inverse reinforcement learning an observer infers the reward distribution available for actions in the environment solely through observing the actions implemented by another agent. To address whether this computational process is implemented in the human brain, participants underwent fMRI while learning about slot machines yielding hidden preferred and non-preferred food outcomes with varying probabilities, through observing the repeated slot choices of agents with similar and dissimilar food preferences. Using formal model comparison, we found that participants implemented inverse RL as opposed to a simple imitation strategy, in which the actions of the other agent are copied instead of inferring the underlying reward structure of the decision problem. Our computational fMRI analysis revealed that anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex encoded inferences about action-values within the value space of the agent as opposed to that of the observer, demonstrating that inverse RL is an abstract cognitive process divorceable from the values and concerns of the observer him/herself.

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Résumé Dans un environnement incertain et changeant, il est fondamental pour un organisme vivant de résoudre le compromis exploration/exploitation. Cette revue d’articles décrit comment une série d’études en neurosciences cognitives a associé le comportement exploratoire à certaines structures du cortex préfrontal humain, puis a identifié les mécanismes cérébraux impliqués dans l’adaptation du comportement par rapport aux altérations des récompenses et enfin a mis en évidence des limites fondamentales dans le traitement des informations au niveau préfrontal. Les expériences et les résultats que nous présentons peuvent particulièrement intéresser les économistes qui souhaitent comprendre comment les neurosciences cognitives identifient des processus clés à l’ œuvre dans le cerveau humain et façonnent notre compréhension de la prise de décision. Classification JEL : D87, D81, D83, C91.