This study addresses the impact of certain audit committee characteristics identified by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) on the likelihood of financial restatement. We examine 88 restatements of annual results (without allegations of fraud) in the period 1991–1999, together with a matched pairs control group of firms of similar size, exchange listing, industry and auditor type. We find that the independence and activity level (our proxy for audit committee diligence) of the audit committee exhibit a significant and negative association with the occurrence of restatement. We also document a significant negative association between an audit committee that includes at least one member with financial expertise and restatement. To test the robustness of the results we also consider a sample of 44 fraud and no-fraud firms and arrive at largely similar findings. Our results underscore the importance of the BRC's recommendations as a means of strengthening the monitoring and oversight role that the audit committee plays in the financial reporting process.

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees, using data gathered under the recent SEC fee disclosure rules. We hypothesize that audit fees will be positively associated with audit committee independence, financial expertise, and meeting frequency. We examine a sample of 492 nonregulated, Big 5-audited firms that filed proxy statements with the SEC in the period from February 5, 2001 to June 30, 2001. We find that audit committee independence (defined as an audit committee comprised entirely of outside, independent directors) and financial expertise (defined as an audit committee containing at least one member with financial expertise) are significantly, positively associated with audit fees. This is in contrast to the findings of Carcello et al. (2002a), who find that audit committee characteristics are not significant in the presence of board-related variables. Meeting frequency (defined as an audit committee that meets at least four times annually) was not associated with higher audit fees at conventional levels. This evidence is consistent with audit committees taking actions within their span of control to ensure a higher level of audit coverage.

This paper provides an overview of the largest longitudinal investigation of institutionalized children less than 2 years old ever conducted. The Bucharest Early Intervention Project is an ongoing randomized controlled trial of foster placement as an alternative to institutionalization in abandoned infants and toddlers being conducted in Bucharest, Romania. In addition to describing the contexts in which this study is imbedded, we also provide an overview of the sample, the measures, and the intervention. We hope that the natural experiment of institutionalization will allow us to examine directly the effects of intervention on early deprivation. We hope it will provide answers to many of the critical questions that developmentalists have asked about the effects of early experience, the timing of deprivation, and the ameliorating effects of early intervention and provide clues to which underlying neurobiological processes are compromised by, and resilient to, dramatic changes in early experience.

The role of the audit committee in corporate governance is the subject of increasing public and regulatory interest. We focus on one frequently noted function of the audit committee: auditor selection. We argue that independent and active audit committee members demand a high level of audit quality because of concerns about monetary or reputational losses that may result from lawsuits or SEC sanction. Auditors who specialize in the client's industry are expected to provide a higher level of audit quality than do nonspecialists. Thus, we predict that firms with audit committees that are both independent and active are more likely to employ an industry-specialist auditor. We find that firms with audit committees that do not include employees and that meet at least twice per year are more likely to use specialists. This study contributes to our understanding of audit committee functions and provides evidence that industry specialization is an important element of auditor selection.

Examines whether two key audit committee characteristics combined, activity and independence, reduce likely fraud or aggressive financial statement actions. Utilizes evidence on potential of Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommendations regarding composition of audit committees, and further involves a sample of 156 firms — 78 subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and 78 similar sized non‐sanctioned firms. Closes by stating future research may be required regarding young and mature firms ‐ that could affect monitoring.