Five experiments examined the effects of fornix transection upon some spatial and visual learning tasks in monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). For each trial of each task, the monkey was brought to a test tray and allowed to choose between 2 objects on the tray. In different tasks, different cues were provided by the experimenter to guide the monkey's choices. In total 5 different tasks were run (Experiments 1 to 5) and the results showed that the effects of fornix transection varied markedly between tasks: the animals with fornix transection were severely impaired in experiments 1, 3 and 5 but learned normally in experiments 2 and 4. It is concluded that the results cannot be explained by the simple hypothesis of a deficit in place learning, since some forms of place learning are unimpaired by fornix transection. A better general hypothesis is that the memory disrupted by fornix transection is like a snapshot memory, which stores the spatial arrangement of items in a witnessed scene.

1984) Effects of fornix transection upon associative memory in monkeys:

No abstract

Cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) were trained in a task that assessed their ability to associate visual stimuli with food reward. Acquisition of stimulus-reward associations was measured under 2 conditions, a 2-stimuli acquisition condition and a 1-stimulus acquisition condition. On each trial in the 2-stimuli condition, the positive (correct) and negative (incorrect) stimuli were presented side by side and the animal chose one by touching it; if the choice was correct, a food reward was dispensed. On each trial in the 1-stimulus condition, either the positive or the negative stimulus was presented alone; if the stimulus was the positive, it was followed by reward delivery, regardless of the animal's response to it, and if it was the negative, it was not followed by reward delivery. Thus, reward delivery was contingent upon the animal's response to the stimuli in the 2- stimuli condition but not in the 1-stimulus condition. The effect of acquisition trials under these 2 conditions was measured, in both conditions, by the animal's subsequent choice when presented with the 2 stimuli side by side. Following preoperative training in this task, the animals were first subjected to unilateral ablation of the inferotemporal cortex. This operation had little effect on the animals' learning ability. Then, the amygdala was ablated in the hemisphere contralateral to that in which the unilateral inferotemporal ablation had been carried out. This combination of crossed unilateral lesions of the amygdala and of the inferotemporal cortex, which disconnects the amygdala from the output of visual association cortex, produced a profound impairment in stimulus-reward-associative learning.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Pigeons were trained to perform a visual discrimination between stimulus sets in which the presence of any two of three positive features made a stimulus positive, while any two of three negative features made it negative (there were thus three different positive and three different negative stimuli). After training, the birds were exposed to test stimuli that contained either all three positive or all three negative features. In Experiment I three pigeons were successfully trained by a successive method, and subsequently responded to the test stimuli as though they were positive or negative respectively. In Experiment II four pigeons were trained by a simultaneous method. Three learned the discrimination and generalized appropriately to the test stimuli, but they showed no preference between positive test and positive training stimuli, nor any consistent difference in speed of response to them; and similar results were found for negative stimuli. It is argued from this that the pigeons learned to respond to the stimuli as patterns (configurations of features) rather than to the constituent features, but that they generalized to the test stimuli by using the common features. The experiments show that pigeons could in principle learn to discriminate natural polymorphous classes (such as “pigeon” or “person”) without using any single feature, but neither the present experiments nor earlier ones demonstrating discriminations of such natural classes establish that pigeons make use of polymorphous concepts in the same way as people.