This article considers whether appeals to 'national values' in public discourse and political debate might be a form of nationalism. This theoretical question about the applicability of the category of nationalism faces the objections that political values cannot constitute nationality, and that this is even more so the case when the values in question are liberal, as they often are. Against these objections, it is argued that 'the nationalisation of liberal values' may, and in some contexts of immigration and Europeanisation probably do, exhibit 'boundary mechanisms' that are among the central features of nationalism. This feature of the nationalisation of liberal values carries both normative and explanatory implications, which relate to the concerns of 'liberal nationalism'.
The chapter examines whether religious markers can legitimately be part of a state supported national identity by considering symbolic religious establishment involving state endorsement of religion. The liberal neutralist position—rejecting any state endorsement of culture or religion—and the liberal culturalist position—allowing culture but not religion to be endorsed by the state—are mistaken.The chapter argues for a disaggregation approach that views religion (and culture) as phenomena with several dimensions, each raising different issues of legitimacy. The chapter considers arguments for symbolic religious establishment based on claims that it does not alienate religious minorities, is liberal in content, and draws on cultural rather than theological dimensions of religion. Therefore, while the disaggregation approach in principle allows for state support for a national identity with religious elements, especially in cases of vestigial establishment, actual cases of symbolic religious establishment, especially cases of neo-establishment, often fail at the bar of equal inclusion.
Tariq Modood argues that European states are only ‘moderately secular’ and that this kind of secularism is compatible with public accommodation of religious groups and provides a model of Muslim integration appropriate for European states. Although attention to the fact of moderate secularism provides a response to a prominent argument against multicultural accommodation of religious minorities, what is really at stake in discussions of multiculturalism and secularism are political principles. Modood's case for accommodation of Muslims along the lines of moderate secularism presupposes a normative conception of equality, but his characterisation of multicultural equality is inadequate in several respects.
If the publication of twelve drawings of the Prophet Mohammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which sparked the 'cartoon controversy', was wrong, why might this be the case? The article considers four arguments advanced in relation to the quite similar Rushdie affair for judging such publications to be wrong, and asks whether they provide plausible moral reasons against such publications, and whether they justify legal restrictions on freedom of speech. The arguments concern: (a) the consistent extension of group defamation legislation to cover Muslims; (b) offence to religious sensibilities; (c) issues of identity; and (d) oppression. The article also considers whether such arguments can be acknowledged within a liberal model of toleration. It is argued that versions of several of the arguments may in fact be thus accommodated, but that they nevertheless do not provide strong reasons for judging the kind of publications under consideration to be morally wrong or suitable objects for legal restrictions. The argument from oppression is different, however, in pointing to different kinds of factors, but its applicability is limited both by a number of conditions for when oppression provides the right kind of reasons, and by empirical constraints. The suggested conclusion is that the publication of the Mohammad cartoons was not wrong, at least not all things considered, for any of the noted reasons, but that there might be other kinds of factors that are not captured by traditional liberal models of toleration, which might provide reasons for moral criticism of this and similar publications. P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 0 7 VO L 5 5 , 4 8 1 -4 9 8
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.