Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) is the predominant SCADA protocol in the energy sector-more than 75% of North American electric utilities currently use DNP3 for industrial control applications. This paper presents a taxonomy of attacks on the protocol. The attacks are classified based on targets (control center, outstation devices and network/communication paths) and threat categories (interception, interruption, modification and fabrication). To facilitate risk analysis and mitigation strategies, the attacks are associated with the specific DNP3 protocol layers they exploit. Also, the operational impact of the attacks is categorized in terms of three key SCADA objectives: process confidentiality, process awareness and process control. The attack taxonomy clarifies the nature and scope of the threats to DNP3 systems, and can provide insights into the relative costs and benefits of implementing mitigation strategies.

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SCADA systems have historically been isolated from other computing resources. However, the use of TCP/IP as a carrier protocol and the trend to interconnect SCADA systems with enterprise networks introduce serious security threats. This paper describes two strategies for securing SCADA networks, both of which have been implemented in a laboratory-scale Modbus network. The first utilizes a security services suite that minimizes the impact on time-critical industrial process systems while adhering to industry standards. The second engages a sophisticated forensic system for SCADA network traffic collection and analysis. The forensic system supports the post mortem analysis of security breaches and the monitoring of process behavior to optimize plant performance.

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Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used in industrial control and automation. Modern SCADA protocols often employ TCPlIP to transport sensor data and control signals.Meanwhile, corporate IT infrastructures are interconnecting with previously isolated SCADA networks. The use of TCPlIP as a carrier protocol and the interconnection of IT and SCADA networks raise serious security issues. This paper describes an architecture for SCADA network forensics. In addition to supporting forensic investigations of SCADA network incidents , the architecture incorporates mechanisms for monitoring process behavior, analyzing trends and optimizing plant performance.