A commonly advanced rationale for the proliferation of brand extensions is companies' motivation to leverage the equity in established brands, thereby developing profitable products relatively easily. A more interesting strategic argument for brand extensions that has been advanced is that extensions would favorably affect the image of the parent brand and thereby influence its choice. In this research, the authors investigate the existence of such reciprocal spillover effects emanating from the advertising of a brand extension. The authors use scanner panel data and study spillover effects of advertising on brand choice. They develop implications for brand and product line management.

Every marketer’s dream is to create a “hot product” that customers would absolutely want to have, thus generating considerable profit to the marketer. According to one school of thought, marketers should make products hard to get in order to create really hot products. In this paper, using a game-theoretic model, we investigate if such scarcity strategies can indeed be optimal. While a scarcity strategy may appear to be a viable approach for making a firm’s product successful, further analysis raises some puzzling issues. In particular, it is not clear why a firm would not increase its price to get demand and supply in sync and increase its profit in the process. We therefore offer a signaling explanation for the optimality of such strategies and show that a high-quality seller may optimally choose to make the product scarce in order to credibly signal the quality of its product to uninformed customers. Our analysis indicates that a high-quality seller optimally employs scarcity as a signaling device in product markets that are characterized, ceteris paribus, by a small difference in marginal cost between high- and low-quality products, a low reservation price for a low-quality product, a greater heterogeneity in reservation prices for a high-quality product, and a moderate number of informed consumers. Our results provide a rationale for the fact that scarcity strategies are usually observed for discretionary or specialty products, but not for commodity products, staple products, or new-to-the-world products.

A product's physical appearance is difficult to quantify, and the impact of product appearance on demand has rarely been studied using market data. The authors adopt a recently developed morphing technique to measure a product's aesthetic design and investigate its effect on consumer preference. Drawing upon categorization theory, the authors consider the effects of three dimensions of aesthetic design—segment prototypicality (SP), brand consistency (BC), and cross-segment mimicry (CSM)—and their moderating effects on marketing mix effectiveness in a unified framework. The empirical analysis uses a unique, large data set consisting of 202 car models from 33 brands sold in the United States from 2003 to 2010. The authors find that consumer preference peaks at moderate levels of SP and BC and that economy-segment products benefit from CSM of luxury products. Moreover, SP intensifies price sensitivity, and BC muffles price sensitivity while increasing advertising effectiveness. Two what-if studies illustrate how managers can use the empirical model to evaluate alternative aesthetic design choices.

Management of brand equity has come to be viewed as critical to a brand's optimal long-term performance. The authors evaluate the usefulness of brand equity estimates obtained from store-level data for monitoring the health of a brand. They use a random coefficients logit demand model calibrated on store-level scanner data to track brand equity estimates over time in two consumer packaged goods categories that experienced several new product introductions during the period of the empirical investigation. Using these tracked measures, the authors also study the impact of marketing actions, such as advertising, sales promotions, and product innovations, on brand equity. They find that the brand equity estimates effectively capture the high equity of strongly positioned popular brands and brands that command a significant price premium in niche markets. Using an example, the authors illustrate how these brand equity estimates can be used to monitor changes in brand equity, which measures such as market share may fail to capture. The substantive results indicate that advertising has a positive effect on brand equity in both the product categories, whereas the effect of sales promotions is not significant in either category. Furthermore, the results reveal that new product innovations have a positive impact on brand equity and can explain a significant proportion of its variation. Overall, the analysis shows that a brand manager can track brand equity using store-level data, gain insights into the drivers of the brand's equity, and manage these drivers to achieve brand equity targets.

Many brands today introduce limited edition (LE) products as part of their product line. However, little is known about the conditions under which a brand should introduce an LE product or the competitive implications of doing so. We investigate this issue using a game theoretic model of a market where two brands compete for consumers who desire exclusivity. Our analysis shows that adding an LE product has a positive direct effect on brand profits through the increased willingness of consumers to pay for such a product, but also has a negative strategic effect by increasing price competition between brands. These effects result in different conclusions depending on the nature of brand differentiation. When brands differ in quality, we show that only the high-quality brand may gain in comparison to a scenario where there are no LE products. Although a low-quality brand may offer an LE product as a defensive strategy, its profits are lower than would be in a world without LE products because of the negative strategic effect. When we consider brands that are differentiated on a horizontal attribute such as taste, we find that the negative strategic effects cause lower equilibrium profits if both brands introduce LE products. Yet brands cannot avoid introducing LE products because they face a .game theory, marketing strategy, product management, pricing research, limited edition products