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In the mid-nineteenth century, almost 70 percent of persons age 65 or older resided with their adult children; by the end of the twentieth century, fewer than 15 percent did so. Many scholars have argued that the simplification of the living arrangements of the aged resulted primarily from an increase in their resources, which enabled increasing numbers of elders to afford independent living. This article supports a different interpretation: the evidence suggests that the decline of coresidence between generations had less to do with the growing affluence of the aged than with the increasing opportunities of the younger generation. Using data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), I examine long-run trends in the characteristics of both the older and the younger generations to gain insight into changing motivations for coresidence. In particular, I investigate headship patterns, occupational status, income, and spatial coresidence patterns. I also reassess the potential impact of the Social Security program. I conclude that the decline of intergenerational coresidence resulted mainly from increasing opportunities for the young and declining parental control over their children.During the past century and a half, the living arrangements of the aged in the United States shifted dramatically. The dimensions of change are illustrated in Figure 1. In 1850, twothirds of whites age 65 or older lived with an adult child. The percentage of elderly whites residing with adult children declined steadily from 1850 to 1980, reaching a nadir of 13 percent in 1990 before rising slightly in 2000. Among blacks, the trend was less dramatic but still sizeable; coresidence fell from 50 percent in 1870 to 22 percent a century later. 1 The transformation of the living arrangements of the aged was equally dramatic among unmarried men, unmarried women, and married couples, although there was slight variation in the timing of change (Ruggles 2003).This article examines explanations for this remarkable simplification of U.S. family structure. I assess historical evidence from the census to uncover clues about the formation of intergenerational families and the incentives for both the older generation and the younger generation to reside together. I argue that scholars have overemphasized the effects of rising income of the older generation and underestimated the role of growing economic independence of the younger generation. More broadly, I argue that the decline of intergenerational coresidence reflects a decline of patriarchal control brought about by the rise of wage labor and the decline of agriculture.Direct correspondence to Steven Ruggles, University of Minnesota, Minnesota Population Center, 50 Willey Hall, 225 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 (ruggles@umn.edu). The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of Catherine Fitch, Miriam King, Carolyn Liebler, Evan Roberts, three anonymous reviewers, the editors of the ASR, and participants at several colloquia and the 2005 meeting of the...

This article critically evaluates the available data on trends in divorce in the United States. We find that both vital statistics and retrospective survey data on divorce after 1990 underestimate recent marital instability. These flawed data have led some analysts to conclude that divorce has been stable or declining for the past three decades. Using new data from the American Community Survey and controlling for changes in the age composition of the married population, we conclude that there was actually a substantial increase in age-standardized divorce rates between 1990 and 2008. Divorce rates have doubled over the past two decades among persons over age 35. Among the youngest couples, however, divorce rates are stable or declining. If current trends continue, overall age-standardized divorce rates could level off or even decline over the next few decades. We argue that the leveling of divorce among persons born since 1980 probably reflects the increasing selectivity of marriage.

A sizable literature suggests that coresidence of elderly persons with their children is on the decline in most developing countries. These studies draw on a long tradition of theories that postulate an inverse association between household complexity and economic development. Our analysis of this topic uses new data and measures to assess changes in intergenerational coresidence in 15 developing countries.We have three main objectives. First, we measure trends in intergenerational coresidence in developing countries from the perspective of both the younger generation and the older generation. Second, we assess trends in intergenerational coresidence by household headship patterns. Finally, we conduct multivariate analyses to control for changes in population composition and to assess the relationship between intergenerational coresidence and economic development.The results indicate no clear trends in intergenerational coresidence over the past several decades. Some countries experienced modest increases in coresidence; other countries had modest declines. Even more intriguing, when we focus on intergenerational families headed by the older generation-the family configuration most closely associated with traditional stem-family and joint-family systems-we find significant increases in all but two of the countries examined. This suggests that traditional family forms are stable or increasing across much of the developing world. Moreover, multivariate analyses reveal that key measures of economic development are positively associated with intergenerational families headed by the older generation. Theories of coresidence and developmentIn the second half of the nineteenth century, Frédéric Le Play proposed that economic development was contributing to a decline of intergenerational coresidence. Traditionally, Le Play argued, generations had been bound together by property. The younger generation remained in the ancestral home, providing labor as the family patriarch grew old and eventually inheriting the farm. With commercial and industrial growth in the nineteenth century, fewer families had property to hand down. As a consequence, Le Play contended, more and more of the elderly began to reside separately from their children (Le Play 1884: 3-28).The idea that economic development is associated with simplification of the household and independent residence of the elderly became widely accepted in the twentieth century. Midtwentieth-century sociological literature highlighted the connection between industrialization and nuclear-family structure (e.g., Parsons 1949;Nimkoff 1962). Intergenerational coresidence was said to be undermined by growing wage labor opportunities, which provided incentives for the younger generation to leave the farm and move to urban areas. Moreover, many theorists argued that small nuclear families were best adapted to urban societies characterized by high geographic and social mobility (Wirth 1938;Parsons and Bales 1955;Burgess 1960). NIH Public Access Author ManuscriptPopul Dev Rev. Autho...

I use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to assess the potential effects of local labor-market conditions on long-term trends and race differences in marital instability. The rise of female labor-force participation and the increase in nonfarm employment are closely associated with the growth of divorce and separation. Moreover, higher female labor-force participation among black women and lower economic opportunities for black men may account for race differences in marital instability before 1940, and for most of such differences in subsequent years. However, unmeasured intervening cultural factors are probably responsible for at least part of these effects.

I use a new data source, the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, to trace race differences in family structure between 1880 and 1980. Analysis confirms recent findings that the high incidence among African-Americans of single parenthood and children residing without their parents is not a recent phenomenon. From 1880 through 1960, black children were two to three times more likely to reside without one or both parents than were white children. In recent years, however, the race differential in parental absence has grown. Also, blacks have had a consistently higher percentage of extended households than have whites, but until 1940 this was the result of single parenthood and parentlessness among children: Extended households were more common among whites once the effects of absent parents were controlled.