Across three studies, we test the hypothesis that the perceived “humanness” of a human face can have its roots, in part, in low-level, feature-integration processes typical of normal face perception—configural face processing. We provide novel evidence that perceptions of humanness/dehumanization can have perceptual roots. Relying on the well-established face inversion paradigm, we demonstrate that disruptions of configural face processing also disrupt the ability of human faces to activate concepts related to humanness (Experiment 1), disrupt categorization of human faces as human (but not animal faces as animals; Experiment 2), and reduce the levels of humanlike traits and characteristics ascribed to faces (Experiment 3). Taken together, the current findings provide a novel demonstration that dehumanized responses can arise from bottom-up perceptual cues, which suggests novel causes and consequences of dehumanizing responses.
Recent research has demonstrated that ascribing minds to humanlike stimuli is a product of both their perceptual similarity to human faces and whether they engaged configural face processing. We present the findings of two experiments in which we both manipulate the amount of humanlike features in faces (in a doll-to-human morph continuum) and manipulate perceivers’ ability to employ configural face processing (via face inversion) while measuring explicit ratings of mind ascription (Study 1) and the spontaneous activation of humanlike concepts (Study 2). In both studies, we find novel evidence that ascribing minds to entities is an interactive product of both having strong perceptual similarity to human faces and being processed using configural processing mechanisms typical of normal face perception. In short, ascribing mind to others is bounded jointly by the featural cues of the target and by processes employed by the perceiver.
Five experiments investigate the hypothesis that heavier weight individuals are denied mental agency (i.e., higher order cognitive and intentional capacities), but not experience (e.g., emotional and sensory capacities), relative to average weight individuals. Across studies, we find that as targets increase in weight, they are denied mental agency; however, target weight has no reliable influence on ascriptions of experience (Studies 1a–2b). Furthermore, the de-mentalization of heavier weight targets was associated with both disgust and beliefs about targets’ physical agency (Study 3). Finally, de-mentalization affected role assignments. Heavier weight targets were rated as helpful for roles requiring experiential but not mentally agentic faculties (Study 4). Heavier weight targets were also less likely than chance to be categorized into a career when it was described as requiring mental agency (versus experience; Study 5). These findings suggest novel insights into past work on weight stigma, wherein discrimination often occurs in domains requiring mental agency.
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