Three studies examined perceptions of the entitativity of groups. In Study 1 (U.S.) and Study 2 (Poland), participants rated a sample of 40 groups on 8 properties of groups (e.g., size, duration, group member similarity) and perceived entitativity. Participants also completed a sorting task in which they sorted the groups according to their subjective perceptions of group similarity. Correlational and regression analyses were used to determine the group properties most strongly related to entitativity. Clustering and multidimensional scaling analyses in both studies identified 4 general types of groups (intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations). In Study 3, participants rated the properties of groups to which they personally belonged. Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 and demonstrated that participants most strongly valued membership in groups that were perceived as high in entitativity.

This article analyzes the similarities and differences in forming impressions of individuals and in developing conceptions of groups. In both cases, the perceiver develops a mental conception of the target (individual or group) on the basis of available information and uses that information to make judgments about that person or group. However, a review of existing evidence reveals differences in the outcomes of impressions formed of individual and group targets, even when those impressions are based on the very same behavioral information. A model is proposed to account for these differences. The model emphasizes the role of differing expectancies of unity and coherence in individual and group targets, which in turn engage different mechanisms for processing information and making judgments. Implications of the model are discussed.

Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far-reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one's past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source-monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual imaginings (i.e., daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories.

Previous research on the natural history of smoking has focused on overall group trajectories without considering the possibility of risk subgroup variation. To address this limitation, the authors of the present study aimed to identify subgroups with varying trajectories of smoking behavior. The authors accomplished this within a cohort-sequential study of a large community sample (N = 8,556) with measurements spanning ages 11-31. After removing 2 a priori groups (abstainers and erratics), the authors empirically identified 4 trajectory groups--early stable smokers, late stable smokers, experimenters, and quitters--and psychosocial variables from adolescence and young adulthood were significantly distinguished among them. Given recent advances in quantitative methods, it is now feasible to consider subgroups of trajectories within an overall longitudinal design.

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Subjects' inability to predict their levels of behavioral compliance was examined in three experiments. In all cases, subjects overpredicted the degree to which their behavior would be socially desirable. More importantly, it was shown in all experiments that these errors of prediction were self-erasing. Having (mis)predicted a given behavior, subjects were likely to have these predictions confirmed in later behavior. The interpretation of these effects is that prediction of a behavioral sequence evokes a specific cognitive representation of that sequence, which is accessed on subsequent occasions. The results demonstrate the strong effects on behavior of engaging in prebehavioral cognitive work. Relationships to Ajzen and Fishbein's notions of behavioral intentions and Abelson's notion of scripts are spelled out. Since people overpredict desirable behaviors and subsequently act in accord with those predictions, implications for effects of behavioral predictions on moral behavior are also suggested.