Theory suggests that eligible voters should be more likely to cast ballots when election margins are close. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Operational definitions of key concepts such as turnout and election closeness are often inconsistent and limited in application to two-party systems. This paper provides a more generalized test of the turnout-competition link in electoral districts. Data are 1993 and 1997 constituency-level election results for the Canadian House of Commons. Canada provides an excellent case for comparison because it has single-member districts, plurality elections, both national and regional parties, and multiparty competition throughout the nation. Several alternative measures for "turnout" and "closeness" are evaluated in the context of multiparty elections. A new index of competitiveness is developed. Multicandidate measures of closeness are related to higher levels of voter participation in Canadian federal elections.Are citizens more likely to vote if an election is close? Empirical research on this question has produced mixed results. Some studies confirm a relationship between closeness and voter turnout; others discount any relationship. A fundamental problem has been the construction of quantitative measures for turnout and closeness. One bias in the literature is toward two-party systems. Operational definitions for closeness, in particular, do not translate well to multiparty systems. This article offers a new method for computing closeness in a multiparty context. We test for effects of this and other variables in the context of the 1993 and 1997 Canadian federal elections. Downs (1957) proposed a theoretical link between the closeness of a given election and voter turnout. In the Downsian model, potential voters decide to participate in an election when the personal costs of voting are outweighed by the benefits accrued from the act of voting. Critics of this expected utility model argue that the chance of casting a vote that decides the outcome of the election is essentially zero. Since voting in and of itself is costly (the time and effort to

Role-playing games and simulations emerged as a classroom technique to provide students an experiential or hands-on approach to learning. Early use of simulations in the political science classroom primarily focused on teaching American politics (Kaarbo and Lantis 1997). However, the contemporary use of simulations now extends into comparative politics (Shellman 2001) and international relations (Jefferson 1999; Thomas 2002).

Classroom educational presentations are an effective means of changing attitudes and improving end-of-life care knowledge. Additional education and support for rural nursing personnel involved with residents of long-term care may enhance end-of-life care.

Are blank or unmarked ballots in an election a random event? The comparative literature on elections suggests otherwise, linking blank ballots to political protest or social and demographic characteristics of voters. Rational choice theory offers explanations rooted in civic duty and net benefits associated with uncompetitive elections. Similarly, when a voter decides to vote, the literature on party competition and electoral turnout offers the possibility that a blank ballot is another choice beyond voting for a specific candidate or party. While little research exists on blank ballots in election systems lacking compulsory voting, this article presents an exploratory analysis using data from the 1999 and 2003 provincial elections in Ontario. The study finds that while demographic characteristics matter, party competition also provides an explanation for casting blank ballots consistent with expectations of rational choice theory.

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