Background COVID-19 is a novel and highly virulent virus, which caused a rapid and massive onset of clinical trials in a short period of time.With the aim to obtain suggestions in the guidance on performing public health emergency clinical trials, and control this virus in China and other countries and for the prevention of the onset of other infectious viruses in the future. Methods COVID-19, SARS, MERS and Ebola clinical trials registered in the Chinese clinical trial registry and clinical trials.gov were collected and analyzed and intervention protocols were descriptively analyzed, focusing on the analysis and comparison of the drug used. The search period ended on February 24, 2020. Results The number of the registered COVID-19 clinical trials was 295. Among 203 intervention trials, 78.3% (159) were drug clinical trials. The 159 COVID-19 trials were designed and analyzed with the highest proportion of random, open control study [66.0% (105)], and blind randomized trials [13.8% (22)]. The drug mostly used was Lopinavir/Ritonavir (15.1%). The sample size median 100,IQR(interquartile range) 140. The number of the registered SARS was 6, MERS 15, and Ebola 97. Among 3 MERS and 19 Ebola drug intervention clinical trials, MERS and Ebola were randomized, blind, and placebo-controlled drug clinical trials accounting for 100% (3) and 31.6% (6), respectively, while SARS were vaccine trials, without drug intervention clinical trials registered. Conclusions Some of the COVID-19 clinical trials and drug selection performed are somewhat disordered, requiring greater attention to the needs, science assumptions, ethics and quality management of the clinical research. Thus, during the epidemic period, the country should deliver guidance on how to perform appropriate emergency clinical trials, design a scientifically based clinical trial program and focus on researching drugs or vaccines that have great potential.

Diagnostic tests for detecting emerging influenza virus strains with pandemic potential are critical for directing global influenza prevention and control activities. In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention received US Food and Drug Administration approval for a highly sensitive influenza polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay. Devices were deployed to public health laboratories in the United States and globally. Within 2 weeks of the first recognition of 2009 pandemic influenza H1N1, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed and began distributing a new approved pandemic influenza H1N1 PCR assay, which used the previously deployed device platform to meet a >8-fold increase in specimen submissions. Rapid antigen tests were widely used by clinicians at the point of care; however, test sensitivity was low (40%-69%). Many clinical laboratories developed their own pandemic influenza H1N1 PCR assays to meet clinician demand. Future planning efforts should identify ways to improve availability of reliable testing to manage patient care and approaches for optimal use of molecular testing for detecting and controlling emerging influenza virus strains.

Phylogenetic analyses of 169 influenza A(H5N1) virus genomes were conducted for samples collected through active surveillance and outbreak responses in Vietnam between September 2010 and September 2012. While clade 1.1 viruses persisted in southern regions, three genetically distinct subgroups of clade 2.3.2.1 were found in northern and central Vietnam. The identification of each subgroup corresponded with detection of novel reassortants, likely due to their overlapping circulation throughout the country. While the previously identified clade 1.1 and A/Hubei/1/2010-like 2.3.2.1 genotypes remained the predominant viruses detected, four viruses were found to be reassortants between A/Hubei/1/2010-like (HA, NA, PB2, PB1, PA, NP) and A/duck/Vietnam/NCVD-885/2010-like (M, NS) viruses and one virus was identified as having A/duck/Vietnam/NCVD-885/2010-like HA, NA, PB1, and NP with A/Hubei/1/2010-like PB2 and PA genes. Additionally, clade 2.3.2.1 A/Hong Kong/6841/2010-like viruses, first detected in mid-2012, were identified as reassortants comprised of A/Hubei/1/2010-like PB2 and PA and A/duck/Vietnam/NCVD-885/2010-like PB1, NP, NA, M, NS genes.

Please cite this paper as: Reyes et al. (2010) Population‐based surveillance for 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in Guatemala, 2009. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses 4(3), 129–140. Background  In April 2009, 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1 (2009 H1N1) was first identified in Mexico but did not cause widespread transmission in neighboring Guatemala until several weeks later. Methodology and principle findings  Using a population‐based surveillance system for hospitalized pneumonia and influenza‐like illness ongoing before the 2009 H1N1 pandemic began, we tracked the onset of 2009 H1N1 infection in Guatemala. We identified 239 individuals infected with influenza A (2009 H1N1) between May and December 2009, of whom 76 were hospitalized with pneumonia and 11 died (case fatality proportion: 4·6%, 95% confidence interval [CI] 2·3–8·1%). The median age of patients infected with 2009 H1N1 was 8·8 years, the median age of those hospitalized with pneumonia was 4·2 years, and five (45·5%) deaths occurred in children <5 years old. Crude rates of hospitalization between May and December 2009 were highest for children <5 years old. Twenty‐one (27·6%) of the patients hospitalized with 2009 H1N1 were admitted to the intensive care unit and eight (10·5%) required mechanical ventilation. Underlying chronic conditions were noted in 14 (18·4%) of patients with pneumonia hospitalized with 2009 H1N1 infection. Conclusions and significance  Chronic illnesses may be underdiagnosed in Guatemala, making it difficult to identify this risk group for vaccination. Children 6 months to 5 years old should be among priority groups for vaccination to prevent serious consequences because of 2009 H1N1 infection.

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