This paper addresses the optimal control problem known as the Linear Quadratic Regulator in the case when the dynamics are unknown. We propose a multi-stage procedure, called Coarse-ID control, that estimates a model from a few experimental trials, estimates the error in that model with respect to the truth, and then designs a controller using both the model and uncertainty estimate. Our technique uses contemporary tools from random matrix theory to bound the error in the estimation procedure. We also employ a recently developed approach to control synthesis called System Level Synthesis that enables robust control design by solving a quasiconvex optimization problem. We provide end-to-end bounds on the relative error in control cost that are optimal in the number of parameters and that highlight salient properties of the system to be controlled such as closed-loop sensitivity and optimal control magnitude. We show experimentally that the Coarse-ID approach enables efficient computation of a stabilizing controller in regimes where simple control schemes that do not take the model uncertainty into account fail to stabilize the true system.

Silo is a new in-memory database that achieves excellent performance and scalability on modern multicore machines. Silo was designed from the ground up to use system memory and caches efficiently. For instance, it avoids all centralized contention points, including that of centralized transaction ID assignment. Silo's key contribution is a commit protocol based on optimistic concurrency control that provides serializability while avoiding all shared-memory writes for records that were only read. Though this might seem to complicate the enforcement of a serial order, correct logging and recovery is provided by linking periodically-updated epochs with the commit protocol. Silo provides the same guarantees as any serializable database without unnecessary scalability bottlenecks or much additional latency. Silo achieves almost 700,000 transactions per second on a standard TPC-C workload mix on a 32-core machine, as well as near-linear scalability. Considered per core, this is several times higher than previously reported results.

Machine learning classification is used in numerous settings nowadays, such as medical or genomics predictions, spam detection, face recognition, and financial predictions. Due to privacy concerns, in some of these applications, it is important that the data and the classifier remain confidential.In this work, we construct three major classification protocols that satisfy this privacy constraint: hyperplane decision, Naïve Bayes, and decision trees. We also enable these protocols to be combined with AdaBoost. At the basis of these constructions is a new library of building blocks for constructing classifiers securely; we demonstrate that this library can be used to construct other classifiers as well, such as a multiplexer and a face detection classifier.We implemented and evaluated our library and classifiers. Our protocols are efficient, taking milliseconds to a few seconds to perform a classification when running on real medical datasets.

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MONOMI is a system for securely executing analytical workloads over sensitive data on an untrusted database server. MONOMI works by encrypting the entire database and running queries over the encrypted data. MONOMI introduces split client/server query execution, which can execute arbitrarily complex queries over encrypted data, as well as several techniques that improve performance for such workloads, including per-row precomputation, space-efficient encryption, grouped homomorphic addition, and pre-filtering. Since these optimizations are good for some queries but not others, MONOMI introduces a designer for choosing an efficient physical design at the server for a given workload, and a planner to choose an efficient execution plan for a given query at runtime. A prototype of MONOMI running on top of Postgres can execute most of the queries from the TPC-H benchmark with a median overhead of only 1.24× (ranging from 1.03× to 2.33× ) compared to an un-encrypted Postgres database where a compromised server would reveal all data.