A central theme throughout the impressive series of philosophical books and articles Stephen Toulmin has published since 1948 is the way in which assertions and opinions concerning all sorts of topics, brought up in everyday life or in academic research, can be rationally justified. Is there one universal system of norms, by which all sorts of arguments in all sorts of fields must be judged, or must each sort of argument be judged according to its own norms? In The Uses of Argument (1958) Toulmin sets out his views on these questions for the first time. In spite of initial criticisms from logicians and fellow philosophers, The Uses of Argument has been an enduring source of inspiration and discussion to students of argumentation from all kinds of disciplinary background for more than forty years.

A more com plete collection in the original languages is to be found in Vols. 13-1'5 of the modem edition of Kepler's collected works, JO H A N N E S KEPLERS GESAM-MELTE W ERKE, ed. von Dyck and Caspar, Munich: C. H. Beck, 1937 and later. In the past, these letters appear to have received insufficient at tention in the study of Kepler's work and position. (The present English translations of all quotations from them are the writer's.) Excerpts from some letters were also translated in Carola Baumgardt,

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intimately related to, and dependent upon, psychology. Conversely, psychology itself, in his scheme, was and should be susceptible to philosophical analysis. The depth of Wundt's belief in this two-way interdependence between psychology and philosophy was perhaps best illustrated in his (191 3) vehement opposition to the proposed separation of psychology and philosophy in German universities (see Ash, 1980). According to Wundt, neither empirical observation (or experiment) nor rational analysis alone could constitute true, complete science. Neither psychology nor philosophy could fulfill its task withollt the other. In taking this stand, Wundt showed that he was clearly aware of the historical dependence of psychology-even the new experimental psychology-upon the discipline of philosophy. (On the indebtedness of the so-called "new psychology" to philosophy, see Leary, 1978Leary, , 1979Leary, , 1980aLeary, , 1980bLeary, , 1982 To put the point in a word, Wundt was not a "positivist," though he did share with Ernst Mach (and many others) a view of experience as the primary "given" from which the different natural sciences arrive at their respective subject matters by various distinctive modes of abstraction. Although he was cautious in his metaphysical speculation, he did not shrink from the discussion of the nature of his subject matter, which he construed as consciousness, or the mind. Besides formulating a rather dynamic view of the mind as "actuality," he also pointed out the practical (as well as intellectual) necessity for a philosophical doctrine about the relation between mind and body: methodological decisions-i. e., day-to-day empirical procedures-are dependent upon such a doctrine. For himself, he preferred and argued for a psychophysical parallelism, at least on a pragmatic level; ultimately, this parallelism reflected Wundt's double-aspect monism (Blumenthal, 1980;Richards, 1980). Still, the point is that Wundt, the "physiological psychologist," argued on essentially philosophical grounds for an autonomous psychology, i.e., a nonreductionistic psychology; and he saw no other way to argue the point, pro or con.In addition to his belief in the integral relationship between psychology and philosophy-and in addition to his belief that psychologists should continue to address the epistemological, ethical, and ontological issues that had given rise to psychological science in the first place-Wundt held yet another supposition that helped to define his research program. We are referring to the distinction he made between different aspects of mental life, i.e., between those that do and those that do not lend themselves to investigation by experimental methods. His view was that purely experimental methods were appropriate only to a restricted range of mental activities and phenomena. In particular, he excluded from their scope just about all those aspects of mental life that are nowadays classified under the heading of "higher mental functions." These other aspects of mental life could be brought within the...

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