The "new economic geography" is a recent body of literature that seeks to explain how resources and production come to be concentrated spatially for reasons other than the standard "geographic" ones. Unlike alternative explanations of the geographic distribution of industry, the literature is not interdisciplinary. The new economic geography lies well within economics proper: it is an offspring of international trade theory, with models characterized by increasing returns, factor mobility, and transportation costs. The models explain the distribution of industry in terms of the opposition of an agglomerating force, the interaction of transportation costs and increasing returns to scale, with a dispersing force, commonly the interaction of transportation costs and a partially fixed input or output market.Some authors outside the new economic geography (e.g., Martin 1999) have criticized it as simplistic, irrelevant, or passé. They claim it employs overly abstract analysis, prioritizes mathematical technique over realistic explanation, and is reminiscent of the much earlier works of Gunnar Myrdal and François Perroux-in comparison to which, however, it falls short. This paper investigates the similarities and differences between the new economic geography and the work of Myrdal and Perroux, who in the previous special issue of this journal were ranked by Zafirovsky (1999, pp. 596, 598) as among the leading twentieth century economic
Building on an analysis of Adam Smith's enumeration of five classes of passions, we show that self-command in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) can be modeled as a game whose structure is identical to endogenous quality or reputation models. While acknowledging Smith's views on the evolutive nature of the general rules of morality (as well as the individual's understanding of them), we take the general rules as given. Within the game's framework we show how self-command can be attained in equilibrium solely due to the `internal reputation effect' arising from one's self-interested behavior. Our game-theoretic reinterpretation of TMS sheds new light on the acquisition of self-command and casts Smith as a sophisticated early theorist: he had already dealt with the issue of reputational enforcement, and wrestled with the same tension that has led to the eductive and evolutive approaches to non-cooperative game theory.
Free trade and protectionist doctrines have long had ambiguous relationships to bilateral trade deals, known throughout the nineteenth century as “reciprocity” arrangements. Henry C. Carey, “the Ajax of Protection” in the nineteenth-century United States, embodies the ambiguity from one side of the controversy. Carey’s early adulthood in the mid- to late 1820s was a time when the forerunners of the Whig Party pursued reciprocity at least partly as a means of fostering protection. In the 1830s, Carey, too, endorsed reciprocity—because he stood for free trade and believed reciprocity would promote it. In the 1840s and 1850s Carey changed his mind, decided that protection was the real “road to perfect freedom of trade,” and for that reason opposed reciprocity with Canada. In the 1870s he remained a protectionist but reconciled his doctrine with reciprocity. This article attempts to explain the changes in the disposition toward reciprocity of America’s foremost protectionist thinker from the Second Party System to the generation after the Civil War.
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