A majority of people the world over eat meat, yet many of these same people experience discomfort when the meat on their plate is linked to the death of animals. We draw on this common form of moral conflict-the meat-paradox-to develop insights into the ways in which morally troublesome behaviors vanish into the commonplace and every day. Drawing on a motivational analysis, we show how societies may be shaped by attempts to resolve dissonance, in turn protecting their citizens from discomfort associated with their own moral conflicts. To achieve this, we build links between dissonance reduction, habit formation, social influence, and the emergence of social norms and detail how our analysis has implications for understanding immoral behavior and motivations underpinning dehumanization and objectification. Finally, we draw from our motivational analysis to advance new insights into the origins of prejudice and pathways through which prejudice can be maintained and resolved.

We review a programme of research on the attribution of humanness to people, and the ways in which lesser humanness is attributed to some compared to others. We first present evidence that humanness has two distinct senses, one representing properties that are unique to our species, and the other-human nature-those properties that are essential or fundamental to the human category. An integrative model of dehumanisation is then laid out, in which distinct forms of dehumanisation correspond to the denial of the two senses of humanness, and the likening of people to particular kinds of nonhuman entities (animals and machines). Studies demonstrating that human nature attributes are ascribed more to the self than to others are reviewed, along with evidence of the phenomenon's cognitive and motivational basis. Research also indicates that both kinds of humanness are commonly denied to social groups, both explicitly and implicitly, and that they may cast a new light on the study of stereotype content. Our approach to the study of dehumanisation complements the tradition of research on infrahumanisation, and indicates new directions for exploring the importance of humanness as a dimension of social perception.Humanness is a fundamental but neglected concept in social psychology. We ascribe it to some entities and deny it to others, and these ascriptions and denials have real consequences. On the one hand, we attribute humanness to ourselves and to other members of our species in a way that is taken for granted, but also perceive some nonhuman entities as if they were human. Beloved pets, temperamental computers, and spiritual beings are sometimes Correspondence should be addressed to Nick Haslam, Downloaded by [Selcuk Universitesi] at 22:04 08 February 2015anthropomorphised, and seen to possess desires, beliefs, and emotions much like our own. On the other hand, history is riddled with occasions when some groups of people have been denied their humanity. Perceiving others as less than human, likening them to beasts or unfeeling objects, and treating them with inhumanity are common occurrences in times of war, genocide, and ethnic conflict. Denials of humanness can also be observed in more everyday phenomena: common terms of abuse compare people to nonhuman entities, individuals who violate social norms are described as beasts or monsters in the news media, and discourse about race and gender contains explicit or thinly veiled comparisons of people to animals. These forms of dehumanisation are, in short, frequently employed strategies in intergroup contexts.This chapter reviews recent research and theory on humanness and the ways in which it is ascribed or denied to others, a topic that has begun to attract lively theoretical and empirical interest. We first attempt the basic theoretical task of clarifying the meaning of humanness, a notoriously slippery concept. Taking off from an important and influential line of research on infrahumanisation (Demoulin et al., 2004b), which defines humanness as that which is unique to ...

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To understand dehumanization, we must understand how humans are contrasted with nonhumans. Our work (Haslam, 2006) proposes two forms of dehumanization, in which people are denied uniquelyhumanattributes and likened to animals, or denied human nature attributes and likened to robots. In the light of this model, we examined the mental capacities that are believed to differentiate humans from animals, robots, and supernatural beings in three cultures (Australia, China, Italy). Cross–culturally consistent patterns emerged, with humans differing from nonhumans on two dimensions that closely resembled our two proposed forms of humanness. Compared to humans, animals were seen as lacking higher cognitive powers and refined emotion, but also as having superior perceptual capacities. Robots chiefly lacked emotion– and desire– related capacities. Supernatural beings had superior cognitive and perceptual capacities. Implications for dehumanization are discussed

People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market‐based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society's future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross‐cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross‐cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.