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There have been important continuities in the political character of American cities over the course of the twentieth century. Cities have also varied in the manner in which their politics have been organized. A useful vehicle for understanding both continuities and variations in city politics is the concept of an urban regime. A variety of regimes can be distinguished which enable us to interpret the course of urban politics in the twentieth century and to connect its essential features to the larger political economy.

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Two frameworks for understanding the debate on regulation are discussed. In the first, an economizing perspective, various institutional arrangements are seen as instruments and the question posed is which is the most efficient in achieving public objectives. The second, a political perspective, begins from economizers' lack of interest in the basic organizing principles of the political structure within which the choice of regulatory arrangements occurs. Conceptions of such principles in the American case are considered and the implications of each for the choice of regulatory institutions are addressed. A parallel discussion is undertaken for the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by noting, among other things, that from a political perspective, an extensive regulatory sector looks more attractive than it does from an economizing perspective.

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Downloaded from 10 Campbell and Alexander {ibid.) state this proposition as follows: "The greater the similarity of a person, P, to another, O, with regard to X, the more likely he is to come to be highly attracted toO." This proposition is central to the work of Festinger (op. cii.), Heider (op. cil.), Homans (op. cit.), and Newcomb (op. cii.).

A variety of arguments have been advanced that deliberation should be at the center of any good political regime in which there is popular self-government. Deliberation is to be the basis for lawmaking, that is, for the making of the collectivity's binding decisions. Thus, John Rawls says, “[O]f course, actual constitutions should be designed as far as possible to make the same determinations as the ideal legislative procedure.” This procedure, in turn, is defined as having laws that result from “rational legislators … who are conscientious, trying to follow the principles of justice as their standard.” These legislators “are not to take a narrow or group-interested standpoint.” Joshua Cohen broadly agrees with Rawls and characterizes Rawls's view as one that argues for a democratic politics that is built around public deliberation. Cohen says (agreeing with Rawls) that “an ideal pluralist scheme, in which democratic politics consists of fair bargaining among groups each of which pursues its particular or sectional interest, is unsuited to a just society.” John Dryzek shares these views and comments that the “essence of democratic legitimacy should be sought … in the ability of all individuals subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic deliberation about that decision.” Others have argued along similar lines, including James Bohman, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, David Gauthier, and Jurgen Habermas.