This paper outlines and defends a notion of 'tragic-remorse'. This moral emotion properly accompanies those actions that involve unavoidable moral wrongdoing in general and dirty hands scenarios in particular. Tragic-remorse differs both phenomenologically and conceptually from regret, agent-regret and remorse. By recognising the existence of tragic-remorse, we are better able to account for our complex moral reality which at times makes it necessary for good persons to act in ways that although justified leave the agent with a moral stain and a particular emotional response.
This article offers a response to Alex Bellamy's article 'Dirty Hands and Lesser Evils in the War on Terror'. It outlines deep errors in his claims about 'dirty hands' and 'lesser evils'. Essentially, these errors result from his failure to grapple with the complexity of dirty hands theory, coupled with his uncritical acceptance that dirty hands scenarios are essentially defined as a clash between a public and private morality. Furthermore, we argue that Bellamy's distinction between 'dirty hands' and 'lesser evils' is a spurious one since all dirty hands cases require a choice between lesser evils. In addition, we reject his claim that dirty hands makes no political sense. For illustrative purposes, we then briefly examine one problematic philosophical issue which needs attention if the notion of dirty hands is to be taken seriously. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of dirty hands by applying it to the issue of torture in the so-called 'war on terror'.
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