Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to carry out a survey in order to better understand the nature of handheld mobile computing use by academic library users and to determine whether there is a significant demand for using the library services with these small screen devices. Design/methodology/approach -A survey is created to measure whether people want to access an OPAC with a small screen. Additionally, through open-ended questions, the survey attempts to gain a broader understanding of handheld mobile computing's impact on, and implications for, the services provided by academic libraries. Findings -A total of 58.4 percent of respondents who own a web-enabled handheld device indicate that they would use small screen devices, such as PDAs or web-enabled cell phones to search a library OPAC. Originality/value -The increasing prevalence of handheld mobile computing devices such as PDAs and web-enabled cell phones warrants investigation as to its impact on libraries. This study examines an academic library user population and the potential demand for using the library's catalog with handheld mobile computing devices

Abstract. Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure the size, composition, diversity, and/or stability of a governing cabinet ‐ is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the ‘strength of government’ hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959–1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of ‘strength of government’, in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time‐series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959–1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems.

Data from the American National Election Studies are used to examine trends in political trust for the period of 1980 to 1988. The data reveal a substantial growth in trust during the first half of the eighties, followed by plummeting confidence in government at the end of the decade. A number of plausible explanations for these shifts in public trust are examined. The analysis reveals that the downturn in trust after 1984 was not a response to the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986. Rather, it reflected the emerging perception that Reagan lacked compassion, as well as growing dissatisfaction with foreign and domestic policies.

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This research addresses two questions of current interest in American politics : Does divided government reduce accountability? Do voters reward or punish incumbent governors and/or their parties on the basis of state economic performance? A multivariate pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of aggregate election outcomes from 1972-91 in forty-three states reveals that the effect of state unemployment on the incumbent gubernatorial party's vote percentage is greatly enhanced when the governor's party controls both chambers of the state legislature. This evidence is consistent with the claim made by responsible party theorists that voters are more able and/or willing to reward or punish a political party when that party's responsibility for government performance is complete. Does divided government make a difference? This question has been asked and debated for much of the history of American political science. While we now know that divided government is much more common than in the past (Fiorina 1992), and some of the reasons why we have divided control of govemment Qacobson 1990; and Fiorina 1992), the actual consequences of unified vs. divided government are still a matter of controversy. Central to all of these discussions is whether or not divided government is inherently healthy for a democratic system.The purpose of this article is to explore empirically one of the fundamental questions in the debate over divided government, a question that is derived from the normative concerns over the desirability of &dquo;responsible government:&dquo;NOTE: This is a revised version of a paper delivered at