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Reforestation and forest conservation are important issues in the Panama Canal Watershed (PCW). Uncertainty remains about relative net benefits of profit-maximizing timber rotations compared to the net present value of incumbent land uses such as cattle ranching. The scientific and popular literatures have displayed enthusiasm for teak (Tectona grandis) and native species plantations. We estimate a realistic yield model for teak, an exotic tree species, based on growth data from actual small scale landholders who were incentivized to convert lands to teak plantations. We use a suite of well fit yield models to solve for the optimal Faustmann rotation and compute the net present value (NPV) of a teak plantation to a private land manager as a starting point for understanding land-use patterns. We compare the NPV from forestry to cattle and find that site characteristics, discount rates, and market prices are all important factors in influencing the land manager's decision to switch from cattle ranching to plantation forestry. We find that traditional cattle ranching is economically competitive, in terms of NPV, with and may often outperform teak plantations within the PCW. This result is robust to the teak yield model selected.

Economists and other social scientists consider fisheries to be common-pool resources because they are characterized by rivalry and nonexcludability (Gordon 1954;Ostrom 1990). Rivalry (also known as subtractability) means that a fish caught by one individual cannot be caught by someone else. Nonexcludability means that either potential users of the resource cannot be prevented from using it or excluding users is costly. Economists often propose rights-based management, also known as catch shares, as an effective option for addressing these central features of the fisheries management problem. That is, to solve the rivalry problem, catch shares cap the total allowable catch, and then, to address the nonexcludability problem, the total catch is allocated to individual fishers or groups of fishers. Individual allocations are typically called individual fishing quotas (IFQs), which are often tradable. This means that catch share programs resemble cap and trade systems used in pollution control.Although the idea of rights-based management in fisheries is 45 years old (Christy 1973), widespread adoption of this approach did not occur until the end of the twentieth century, and it is only since then that economists have assembled empirical evidence about the performance of catch shares. Recent research finds that catch shares generally slow the "race to fish" that results from nonexcludability (Birkenbach, Kaczan, and Smith 2017), generate improvements in safety at sea (Pfeiffer and Gratz 2016), and produce more sustainable biological outcomes (Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). In addition, there is some evidence of revenue gains stemming from the slower fishing pace, which also promotes the targeting of higher-quality fish that are sold fresh over a longer portion of the season (Homans and Wilen 2005). While

A B S T R A C TEcological diversity is especially high in the Gulf of Mexico, and multiple Gulf of Mexico resources imply complex management challenges. Yet, relatively little is known about social values of marine biodiversity in the Gulf of Mexico. This article uses results from a stated preference survey of nationally representative households to quantify economic values. The specific assessment scenario involves a current policy proposal to expand the boundaries of the Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary. Willingness to pay estimates range from $35-$107 per household. Respondent characteristics are related to willingness to pay in ways consistent with economic intuition and theory. We conclude with aggregate willingness to pay calculations, and results suggest that total social benefits of marine reserve expansion in the Gulf region are large.Key words: Marine biodiversity, Gulf of Mexico, national marine sanctuary.JEL Codes: Q22, Q28, Q51. INTRODUCTIONThe Gulf of Mexico is a hub of marine biodiversity, commercial fishing, oil and gas exploration and drilling, and outdoor recreation. Managing multiple uses in the area is costly and controversial, and scholars and policymakers regularly debate the cost effectiveness of marine conservation and biodiversity protection (Coleman, Baker, and Koenig 2004;Cruz and McLaughlin 2008). Discussions of conservation costs focus on restrictions to commercial fishing and oil/gas sectors, administrative expenditures, and economic losses to local communities. Discussions of conservation benefits, however, are comparatively vague, as both use and non-use values for preserving marine biodiversity are difficult to measure. Balanced policy choices, however, require a more complete understanding of such benefits.This study explores US residents' willingness to pay (WTP), a measure of social value, for marine protected areas in the Gulf of Mexico. We focus on marine conservation in the Gulf of Mexico for three reasons. First, ecological diversity there is especially high. A current census ofStephanie F. Stefanski is a PhD student, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 9 Circuit Dr., Durham, NC 27708 USA (email: stephanie.stefanski@duke.edu). Jay P. Shimshack, Associate Professor of Public Policy and Economics, Frank Batten School, University of Virginia, 235 McCormick Rd., Charlottesville, VA 22904 USA (email: jay.shimshack@virginia.edu).The authors thank Editor-in-Chief Martin Smith, an anonymous associate editor, three anonymous referees, Bob Leeworthy, G. P. Schmahl, the staff of the NOAA Office of Marine Sanctuaries, Quenton Dokken, the staff of the Gulf of Mexico Foundation, Timothy Beatty, Rob Mendelsohn, and Michael B. Ward for helpful discussions. The authors also thank Tulane University's Murphy Institute, Newcomb College, and Georges Lurcy program for generous support. global marine biodiversity ranked the Gulf of Mexico in the top five in both species per unit area and threats to species diversity (Costello et al. 2010). Second, Gulf Coast resourc...

a b s t r a c tIn Península Valdés, (Patagonia) Argentina, the consequences of poor waste management and an overpopulation of kelp gulls has led to gulls feeding on living southern right whales, potentially causing losses to the tourism industry through loss in coastal quality and suboptimal right whale viewing experiences. Despite local progress in closing waste disposal sites and culling gulls, both waste and pest problems persist. While this problem could impact the long-term viability of the site as a whale watching destination and present conservation concerns, little research has been done concerning the socio-economic aspects of the problem. The present study interviewed 650 tourists about their willingness to pay to manage the gulls versus the waste in order to reduce the gull population and remove the risk to the whales. This research finds that tourists favor addressing the human-driven component of the problem, the waste, over culling the natural component of the problem, the kelp gulls. These findings present a remarkable insight to assessing trade-offs between two management strategies to a local problem associated with coastal development and tourism. The results could further be broadened to other destinations facing waste and pest management challenges in the face of growing tourism and urbanization.

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Seafood is one of the most internationally-traded food commodities. International markets can provide higher revenues that benefit small-scale fishing communities but can also drive a decline in fished populations. Collective action in collective organizations such as fishing cooperatives is thought to enhance the sustainability of fished populations. However, our knowledge of how collective action enables fishing cooperatives to achieve positive social-ecological outcomes is dispersed across case studies. Here, we present a quantitative, national-level analysis exploring the relationship between different levels of collective action and social-ecological outcomes. We found that strong collective action in Mexican lobster cooperatives was related to both sustaining their fisheries and benefiting from international trade. In the 15-year study period, lobster cooperatives that demonstrate characteristics associated with strong collective action captured benefits from trade through high catch volumes and revenue. Despite lower (but stable) average prices, the biomass of their lobster populations was not compromised to reap these benefits. Individual case studies previously found that fishing cooperatives can support both positive social and ecological outcomes in small-scale fisheries. Our results confirm these findings at a national level and highlight the importance of strong collective action. Thus, our work contributes to a better understanding of the governance arrangements to promote fishing communities' welfare and benefits from international trade and, therefore, will be invaluable to advancing small-scale fisheries governance.