This article provides a comparative conceptual analysis of the logic of populism and the logic of (constitutional) democracy. Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous body. The logic of this ideology is further developed in reference to the work of Carl Schmitt and is shown to generate all the characteristics typically ascribed to populism. The logic of democracy is analyzed on the basis of the work of Claude Lefort and defined as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This analysis replaces the widespread model of constitutional democracy as a paradoxical combination of a constitutional and a democratic pillar. This two-pillar model fails to appreciate the internal coherence and some of the main features of the (constitutional) democratic logic. Thereby, the two-pillar approach gives rise to an understanding of populism as continuous with the democratic promise of constitutional democracy. In contrast, our analysis explains populism as the closure of the empty place of democracy. This highlights the antagonistic discontinuity between the logic of populism and the logic of democracy.P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 0 7 VO L 5 5 , 4 0 5 -4 2 4

This chapter argues that liberal democracy and populism, despite both being committed to the idea of popular sovereignty, rely on incompatible conceptualizations of the demos and, consequently, embody antagonistic and irreconcilable understandings of the concept of democracy. It subsequently challenges the wide-spread assumption that populism might have beneficial effects. Although populism operates as a symptom, signaling an underlying malfunctioning of our liberal democratic system, it can never itself function as the remedial corrective. Instead, it should be considered an important threat to democracy, which ought to be countered by actions aiming to remedy both the symptom and the underlying problem.

In this article we develop a concentric containment policy for dealing with political extremism starting from the deliberative model of democracy. This model of democracy is particularly well suited because it overcomes the traditional opposition between procedural and substantive views of democracy. On the procedural side, deliberative democracy emphasises the importance of tracking all the relevant concerns of citizens in the public sphere, whereas, on the substantive side, it stresses the need for an adequate filtering which guarantees the compatibility of actual policies with the core values of liberty and equality. The twofold requirement of tracking and filtering translates into a guideline of decreasing tolerance towards extremist organisations as they approach the centres of formal decision‐making power. We argue that the resulting containment policy, which listens to extremist voters and simultaneously puts unremitting civilising pressure on extremist parties, is not only desirable from a normative point of view; as shown by the empirical findings concerning the successes and failures of actual containment strategies, the twofold concentric approach, including, if necessary, a cordon sanitaire around the extremist party, might also turn out to be the most effective one.

No abstract