Contemporary career mobility models do not fully explain up-or-out promotional systems in professional service firms (PSFs). We propose a PSF career mobility model, which represents hiring decisions as investments in options on future human capital acquisitions and promotions as exercise of those options. Promotional outcomes depend mainly on the development of employee's human capital and business conditions at the time of partnership consideration. The model explains seemingly paradoxical firm behavior, such as dismissal of nonpromoted but productive employees. Career mobility in organizations continues to receive a good deal of attention in the management literature. For example, promotion interdependence (Barnett & Miner, 1992), managerial career development (Demougin & Siow, 1994), promotion/turnover relationships (Johnston, Griffeth, Burton, & Carson, 1993), promotion equity (Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Shalit, 1992), and tournament mobility (Sheridan, Slocum, Buda, & Thompson, 1990) have been the subject of contemporary researchers' investigations. However, most of this work has been conducted with respect to classical business firms, in which ownership, management, and production functions are separate; promotions entail incremental advancement along multistep job ladders; and nonpromoted individuals are typically retained in their current positions (Kilbourne, Miller, & Cardinal, 1993). It remains unclear whether theoretical models developed in this context should apply to professional service firms (PSFs), in which ownership, management, and production functions are concentrated among the same persons; promotions entail few, large steps toward partnership; and nonpromoted individuals historically have left the organization pursuant to an "up-or-out" rule (Nelson, 1988). The up-or-out system perhaps most distinguishes professional service organizations from other types of firms (Maister, 1982). Nevertheless, despite prevalence of this system in organizations ranging from law, The authors wish to acknowledge valuable comments from Jeffrey B.

The authors linked interview structure and litigation outcomes conceptually and empirically. Using legal and psychological literatures, they established a conceptual link based on reduced opportunities for differential treatment through standardization, reduced potential for bias through increased objectivity, and increased job relatedness. Analyzing decisions regarding 84 disparate-treatment claims and 46 disparate-impact claims in federal court cases, they established an empirical link between interview structure and how judges explained their verdicts. The 17 aspects of interview structure were scored in these cases. They collapsed into 3 composites: objective-job related, standardized administration, and multiple interviewers. Most items and composites were significantly related to favorable verdicts for defendants in both types of claims. The objective-job related composite was most highly related, followed by standardized administration. It is concluded that structure enhances interview reliability and validity, and it is also linked to litigation outcomes.

Compensation research distinguishes between satisfaction with pay level and the system that determines and delivers pay, but has neglected to make a similar distinction with respect to benefits. We (1) develop a measure of the benefit system satisfaction construct, (2) examine the discriminant validity of benefit system satisfaction, and (3) examine aspects of procedural and distributive justice and transaction costs as they relate to benefit satisfaction. Confirmatory factor analysis of a comprehensive pay satisfaction measure supported a separate benefit system satisfaction dimension. Structural equation models supported common and unique antecedents of benefit system and benefit level satisfaction, and supported their relationships with global job satisfaction.

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