Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between internal audit function (IAF) characteristics and organizational variables and IAF’s self-investigation about fraud and irregularities (SIFI) in the French context. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the responses of 96 chief audit executives (CAEs) to a global survey of the internal auditing profession carried out by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIARF) in 2010. A logistic regression model is used to determine factors influencing IAF’s SIFI. Findings The authors’ findings reveal that IAF’s SIFI is positively correlated to independence and objectivity, the number of activities performed by the function, adoption of a systematic approach to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management and the size of the company. Research limitations/implications This study examines the factors associated only to IAF’s investigation rather than assessment of the risk of fraud. It remains for future research to analyze determinants those related to internal auditors’ approaches when they evaluate the risk of fraud. Practical implications The findings have implications for CAEs who wish to improve the IAF’s ability to investigate fraud. Originality/value Even if the IIA has stipulated since 2009 that internal auditors must have knowledge to evaluate the risk of fraud, no disclosure requirement exists, in France, for IAF or its charter. The areas of research related to internal audit behavior in relation to fraud concern fraud risk investigation of financial fraud and management/employee misconduct.

We examine responses of 2,160 internal auditors to a global survey of the internal auditing profession carried out by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation from 2009 to 2013. We found that when the internal audit function's (IAF's) quality is high, the external audit fees will be low. This result confirms the substitution effect. We also found that when internal audit hours work increase, audit fees will be high; indicating a complementary effect between these variables. The internal auditor can be the external audit assistant and fully engaged in specific monitoring and control tasks. Nevertheless, he also may be an independent partner of an external audit and fully engaged in corporate governance. If the external auditor apprehends that audit risk is low due to the quality of the IAF, he will require lower fees. If the IAF's work devoted to external audit is high, a signal of a great firm commitment in reinforcing corporate governance is transmitted. Such signal proves the company's willingness to invest more in improving the external audit quality and fees will be high.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of corporate governance failure, excess remuneration and entrenchment of managers, company variables and corporate governance variables on the company’s financial distress risk (DETR) in the French context. Design/methodology/approach Using the regression analysis, this paper is based on 201 observations about 67 companies of SBF 120 from 2015 to 2017. Data are collected on the Thomson Reuters database and in the referenced documents, which are published on the internet. Findings The research findings reveal that firm’s DETR is influenced negatively by excess remuneration and entrenchment of managers. In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between DETR and company variables (performance and ownership structure) and corporate governance variables (power structure). However, a company’s size and board of directors’ independence do not affect firms’ DETR. Practical implications The impact highlighted between remuneration and entrenchment of managers and the financial distress of the company is explained by the intention of managers to work for announcing good short-term performance indicators that are most favorable to them. Originality/value The shareholder/manager agency problem can be changed when business performance tends to decline. Certainly, the managerial latitude adopted by the managers is used as an external careerism strategy. Its positive impact on the reduction of the firm’s financial distress can benefit shareholders who aim to sell their securities in the short term.

Cette étude tente de mettre en évidence la relation qui peut exister entre les biais comportementaux des dirigeants et la structure du capital des petites et moyennes entreprises tunisiennes cotées et non cotées. L’étude empirique est faite sur un échantillon de 120 chefs d’entreprise. La mesure des biais d’excès de confiance et d’optimisme a été faite à partir de l’analyse des préférences exprimées par le dirigeant sur une liste d’items insérée dans le cadre d’un questionnaire. Les réponses ont subi une analyse en composantes principales et une analyse factorielle non linéaire. La confiance en soi, la gestion émotionnelle et le savoir-faire expriment l’excès de confiance. L’intuition, la prévision et la motivation reflètent l’optimisme. Les résultats montrent une corrélation positive entre les biais comportementaux et le ratio d’endettement. Ce dernier a été aussi expliqué par une relation positive avec la tangibilité des actifs ; et négatif avec la rentabilité, les opportunités de croissance et la taille de la firme.

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