We provide novel evidence supporting the notion that arbitrageurs can contribute to return comovement via exchange trade funds (ETF) arbitrage. Using a large sample of US equity ETF holdings, we document the link between measures of ETF activity and return comovement at both the fund and the stock levels, after controlling for a host of variables and fixed effects and by exploiting the 'discontinuity' between stock indices. The effect is also stronger among small and illiquid stocks. An examination of ETF return autocorrelations and stock lagged beta provides evidence for price reversal, suggesting that some ETF-driven return comovement may be excessive.

More patriotic countries have greater home bias in their equity selection. In a panel of World Values Surveys covering 53 countries, measures of patriotism are positively related to home bias measures after controlling for transaction barriers, diversification benefits, information, and familiarity. Within-country changes in patriotism vary with changes in the home bias. The results are robust to using ISSP measures of patriotism covering 24 countries and within-U.S. data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Instrumenting patriotism with social variables uncorrelated with economic and political factors confirms that patriotism affects investment. The average country invests $18 to $30 billion more abroad (a 3% to 5% increase) with a one standard deviation drop in patriotism.

No abstract

The number of U.S. publicly traded firms has halved in 20 years. How will this shift in ownership structure affect the economy’s externalities? Using comprehensive data on greenhouse gas emissions from 2007 to 2016, we find that independent private firms are less likely to pollute and incur EPA penalties than are public firms, and we find no differences between private sponsor-backed firms and public firms, controlling for industry, time, location, and a host of firm characteristics. Within public firms, we find a negative association between emissions and mutual fund ownership and board size, suggesting that increased oversight may decrease externalities.

No abstract