The decarbonisation of the global economy in response to the climate crisis and the fourth industrial revolution, featuring artificial intelligence (AI) and 5G networks (massively accelerated in response to the coronavirus pandemic), has triggered a race to secure uninterrupted access to critical raw minerals (CRMs) that are indispensable inputs for high-technology applications. Moreover, China's Belt and Road Initiative, which unites Eurasia and Africa and loops in South America into a seamless space of trade, infrastructure and digital connectivity, challenges the dominance of traditional industrial powers (the United States, the European Union and Japan) and requires critical minerals. Rare earths, lithium and cobalt-among the most critical of the CRMsare found in high geographic concentration, creating hotspots of contention, especially in unstable parts of the world. As economic transformations accelerate, securing access to these materials will both impact and help shape geopolitics in the years to come.
In 2010, because of a geopolitical incident between China and Japan, seventeen elements of the periodic table known as rare earths became notorious overnight. An “unofficial” and temporary embargo of rare-earth shipments to Japan alerted the world to China’s near monopoly position on the production and export of these indispensable elements for high-tech, defense, and renewable energy sources. A few months before the geopolitical confrontation, China had chosen to substantially cut export quotas of rare earths. Both events sent shockwaves across the markets, and rare-earth prices skyrocketed, prompting reactions from industrial nations and industry itself. The rare-earth crisis is not a simple trade dispute, however. It also raises questions about China’s use of economic statecraft and the impacts of growing resource competition. A detailed and nuanced examination of the rare-earth crisis provides a significant and distinctive case study of resource competition and its spill-over geopolitical effects. It sheds light on the formulation, deployment, longevity, effectiveness, and, perhaps, shortsightedness of policy responses by other industrial nations, while also providing an example of how China might choose to employ instruments of economic statecraft in its rise to superpower status.
Significant amounts of feedstock metals will be required to build the infrastructure for the green energy transition. It is currently estimated, however, that the world may be facing an "infrastructure gap" that could prevent us from meeting United Nations Sustainable Development Goal targets. Prior investigations have focused on the extractive aspects of the mining industry to meet these targets and on looming bottlenecks and regional challenges in these upstream market segments. Scant attention has been paid to the downstream processing segments of the raw materials value chain, which also has a high degree of market concentration. Growing international tensions and geopolitical events have resulted in a shift toward "reshoring" and "near-shoring" of mining processing capabilities as regional powers attempt to make metal supply chains more secure. While increasing resilience, these shifts can also dilute the overall effectiveness of the global mining supply network and subsequently hamper the world's ability to close the green energy infrastructure gap. We argue that broadening the remit of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) to include coordinating these mission-critical metal processing functions can mitigate these issues. The G20 is one potential forum for enabling an integrated mineral processing agreement under the auspices of IRENA.
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