The critique of silence in International Relations theory has been long-standing and sustained. However, despite the lasting popularity of the term, little effort has been made to unpack the implications of existing definitions and their uses, and of attempts to rid the worlds of theory and practice of silences. This article seeks to fill this vacuum by conducting a twofold exercise: a review and revision of the conceptualisation of silence current in the literature; and a review of the implications of attempts to eliminate silence from the worlds of theory and practice. Through the discussion, the article suggests that we deepen and broaden our understanding of silence while simultaneously accepting that a degree of silence will be a permanent feature of theory and practice in international politics. Finally, the conclusion illustrates the possibilities for analysis and theory opened by these arguments through an exploration of how they may be used to interpret and address recent events in Yemen.
This article introduces an innovative approach to the role-play teaching technique: one driven by the presence of substance incentives. We analyse the effectiveness of this incentive-driven role-play approach in the engagement of students with International Relations and Security Studies seminars. We assess its usefulness on multiple fronts. We propose that incentive-driven role-play is an effective method of teaching that caters for students' different learning styles, particularly in theory topics. Its interactive component makes theory tangible for students, allowing them to grasp why certain actions are taken and the consequences of these actions. The use of incentives was found to be important in ensuring motivation, participation and providing easily understandable outcomes that can be transferred to the theory they were studying. This article also highlights the practicalities involved in incentive-driven role-play exercises, noting the importance of clear instructions and precursor lectures on the subject matter.
The failed state thesis has been a matter for discussion in the international relations academy for more than two decades. However, the soundness of this analytic framework has been questioned. This article critically engages this debate by examining the ability of the thesis to provide insight into the practice of statecraft in the case of Yemen. It argues that as a result of its rigid and Eurocentric approach, the failed state thesis is unable to recognise the strategies employed by states like Yemen to ensure their survival, which include the purposeful production of chaos.
This article examines the conceptualisations of peace and its preconditions manifested in the critical turn in peace theory: bottom-up approaches which begin with particular contexts and postulate diverse local actors as integral to the process of peace-building. This article argues that the turn is at an impasse and is unable to address the crucial charge that its conceptualisation of peace is inconsistent. To explain the persistence of inconsistency and to move us forward, the article analyses, evaluates and responds to the turn through the lens of Nicholas Rengger’s work on the anti-Pelagian imagination in political theory. This is defined as a tendency to begin theorising from non-utopian, anti-perfectionist and sceptical assumptions. Through this examination the article argues that the critical turn is anti-Pelagian but not consistently so because it often gives way to perfectionism, adopts naïve readings of institutions and postulates demanding conceptions of political agency and practice. This inconsistency with its own philosophical premises makes the turn’s conceptualisation of peace and its preconditions incoherent. Finally, the article sketches an alternative account of peace which draws upon a number of anti-Pelagian scholars and mobilises Rengger’s particular defense of anti-Pelagianism. The suggested alternative, the article argues, provides us with a more coherent theory of peace and a way out of existing dead ends.
This collection contributes to debates, which seek to move feminist scholarship away from the reification of the war/peace and security/economy divides. However, rather than focusing on the terms of the debate, it foregrounds the empirical reality of the breakdown of these traditional divisions, paying particular attention to the 'state of exception' and similar frameworks. In doing so, contributors to this collection trouble the ubiquitous concept and practices of '(in)security' and their effects on differentially positioned subjects. By gendering (in)securities in 'states of exception' and other paradigms of government related to it, especially in postcolonial and neo-colonial contexts, it provides an approach, which allows us to study the complex and interrelated security logics, which constitute the messy realities of differentand particularly vulnerablesubjects' lives. In other words, it suggests that these frameworks are ripe for feminist interventions and analyses of the logics and production of (in)securities as well as of resistance and hybridisation.
This article argues that the Aden Insurgency was a pivotal moment in the history of British counterinsurgency. We argue that it was in Aden where the newfound strength of human rights discourse, embodied in Amnesty International, and of anti-colonial sentiment, expressed by the UN General Assembly, forced the British government to pay attention to public perceptions of colonial brutality. Using archival sources, we foreground three episodes in the history of the insurgency to support our argument and to illustrate that the changes witnessed were not the result of 'learning' but of a fundamental shift in the international environment.Counter-insurgency, which as a distinct theory of warfare was developed from the 19th century onwards -more intensely so between 1944 and 1980 in response to the wars of decolonisation and national liberation1 -has recently become the subject of both academic and popular scrutiny. The theories of such warfare have been significantly revised since the publication of Callwell's seminal Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices.2 In current scholarly conceptualisation, the insurgents are no longer necessarily depicted as uncivilised, unreasonable and barbaric but sometimes as representing a complex challenge even in the context of technological and numerical disadvantage.3 Historical lessons from such conflicts are now studied hard, not least within the UK. Over the years of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan there has been a renewed interest in the lessons which may be derived from previous British campaigns. In this article, we highlight one specific aspect of recent deliberations which is that of the international context in which any campaign takes place. We argue that Aden provides a lesson of how international pressure and opinion can affect the politics of a conflict. We also argue that the Aden Campaign is important because of the growing attention paid to 'colonial' encounters.The history of British counter-insurgency in the post-1945 period started with the failed campaign in Palestine, and continued through the various campaigns of decolonisation and nationalist struggle across the globe, including more than 30 years of bloody campaigns of Northern Ireland. The histories of these encounters have proved controversial with 'official' versions contested by the governments and peoples resistant to British rule. Perhaps one of the most important developments in recent years has been a reshaping of the insurgent experience. Not least we now have scholarly or journalistic works documenting the abuse suffered by Kenyans4 and Malayans5 at the hands of British troops. These recent findings have made their way into public realm, with the British courts recently granting Kenyans 'abused' during the 1950s campaigns, financial compensation. And in the post 9/11 years there has been much concern over issues such as internment, torture and summary executions. Recent work has revisited the British 'way' of counterinsurgency with scholars seeking to establish whether it was 'nasty' or 'nice'.6 Ot...
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