We present a logical setting that incorporates a belief-revision mechanism within Dynamic-Epistemic logic. As the "static" basis for belief revision, we use epistemic plausibility models, together with a modal language based on two epistemic operators: a "knowledge" modality K (the standard S5, fully introspective, notion), and a "safe belief" modality 2 ("weak", non-negatively-introspective, notion, capturing a version of Lehrer's "indefeasible knowledge"). To deal with "dynamic" belief revision, we introduce action plausibility models, representing various types of "doxastic events". Action models "act" on state models via a modified update product operation: the "ActionPriority" Update. This is the natural dynamic generalization of AGM revision, giving priority to the incoming information (i.e. to "actions") over prior beliefs. We completely axiomatize this logic, and show how our update mechanism can "simulate", in a uniform manner, many different belief-revision policies.

In this paper, we present a semantical approach to multi-agent belief revision and belief update. For this, we introduce relational structures called conditional doxastic models (CDM's, for short). We show this setting to be equivalent to an epistemic version of the classical AGM Belief Revision theory. We present a logic of conditional beliefs that is complete w.r.t. CDM's. Moving then to belief updates (sometimes called "dynamic" belief revision) induced by epistemic actions, we consider two particular cases: public announcements and private announcements to subgroups of agents. We show how the standard semantics for these types of updates can be appropriately modified in order to apply it to CDM's, thus incorporating belief revision into our notion of update. We provide a complete axiomatization of the corresponding dynamic doxastic logics. As an application, we solve a "cheating version" of the Muddy Children Puzzle.

The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a dynamic logic formalism for reasoning about information flow in composite quantum systems. This builds on our previous work on a complete quantum dynamic logic for single systems. Here we extend that work to a sound (but not necessarily complete) logic for composite systems, which brings together ideas from the quantum logic tradition with concepts from (dynamic) modal logic and from quantum computation. This Logic of Quantum Programs (LQP) is capable of expressing important features of quantum measurements and unitary evolutions of multi-partite states, as well as giving logical characterisations to various forms of entanglement (for example, the Bell states, the GHZ states etc.). We present a finitary syntax, a relational semantics and a sound proof system for this logic. As applications, we use our system to give formal correctness proofs for the Teleportation protocol and for a standard Quantum Secret Sharing protocol; a whole range of other quantum circuits and programs, including other well-known protocols (for example, superdense coding, entanglement swapping, logic-gate teleportation etc.), can be similarly verified using our logic.

We present two equivalent axiomatizations for a logic of quantum actions: one in terms of quantum transition systems, and the other in terms of quantum dynamic algebras. The main contribution of the paper is conceptual, offering a new view of quantum structures in terms of their underlying logical dynamics. We also prove Representation Theorems, showing these axiomatizations to be complete with respect to the natural Hilbert-space semantics. The advantages of this setting are many: (1) it provides a clear and intuitive dynamic-operational meaning to key postulates (e.g. Orthomodularity, Covering Law);(2) it reduces the complexity of the Solèr-Mayet axiomatization by replacing some of their key higher-order concepts (e.g. "automorphisms of the ortholattice") by first-order objects ("actions") in our structure; (3) it provides a link between traditional quantum logic and the needs of quantum computation.

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We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear "no". Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth's proposal of applying Tarski's semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical-experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operationalrealistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of "the logic of yes-no experiments" (or "questions"). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the "non-classicality" of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.

We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models. Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to extensive games, we "simulate" the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements) that the node is reached. We then use the notion of "stable belief", i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann's and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the "epistemic openness of the future") underlying Stalnaker's criticism of Aumann's proof. The "dynamic" nature of our concept of rationality explains why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the "backward induction paradox": it is consistent to (continue to) believe in a player's rationality after updating with his irrationality.