In many countries, the collective sale of television rights by sports leagues has been challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, the leagues won in court, on the ground that sport is not a standard good. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of television rights collectively by sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare point of view. We find that collective sale is socially preferable when (a) leagues are small and relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and (b) teams get little performance‐related revenues. (JEL: L10, L83)

Using a diff-in-diff approach, we compare the impact on board and directors' characteristics of mandatory vs advisory regulations on gender quotas in corporate boards. We focus on the experience of three European countries: France and Italy (mandatory regime) vs UK (advisory regime). Our results show that while the percentage of Women on Boards (WoB) generally increases after the introduction of the regulation, this effect is stronger in mandatory regimes. We also find that the quality of the board, measured by several indicators such as size, busyness, qualifications, independence, generally improves more in mandatory regimes. Finally, we also document that gender quotas have had no effect on the likelihood of appointing female executives and board chairwomen in either regime.

This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. uncertainty is resolved prior to the start of trading, but rather continues to be resolved into the beginning of the after market. We term this type of uncertainty as ex-post value uncertainty and develop proxies for it. We find strong support for the existence of ex-post value uncertainty and find that including a proxy for it more than doubles the explanatory power of previous models. Permanent repository link

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The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006Multi-units auctions, Common value, Mechanism design, Revelation principle.,