Objective To identify the source (press releases or news) of distortions, exaggerations, or changes to the main conclusions drawn from research that could potentially influence a reader’s health related behaviour.Design Retrospective quantitative content analysis.Setting Journal articles, press releases, and related news, with accompanying simulations.Sample Press releases (n=462) on biomedical and health related science issued by 20 leading UK universities in 2011, alongside their associated peer reviewed research papers and news stories (n=668).Main outcome measures Advice to readers to change behaviour, causal statements drawn from correlational research, and inference to humans from animal research that went beyond those in the associated peer reviewed papers.Results 40% (95% confidence interval 33% to 46%) of the press releases contained exaggerated advice, 33% (26% to 40%) contained exaggerated causal claims, and 36% (28% to 46%) contained exaggerated inference to humans from animal research. When press releases contained such exaggeration, 58% (95% confidence interval 48% to 68%), 81% (70% to 93%), and 86% (77% to 95%) of news stories, respectively, contained similar exaggeration, compared with exaggeration rates of 17% (10% to 24%), 18% (9% to 27%), and 10% (0% to 19%) in news when the press releases were not exaggerated. Odds ratios for each category of analysis were 6.5 (95% confidence interval 3.5 to 12), 20 (7.6 to 51), and 56 (15 to 211). At the same time, there was little evidence that exaggeration in press releases increased the uptake of news.Conclusions Exaggeration in news is strongly associated with exaggeration in press releases. Improving the accuracy of academic press releases could represent a key opportunity for reducing misleading health related news.

BackgroundExaggerated or simplistic news is often blamed for adversely influencing public health. However, recent findings suggested many exaggerations were already present in university press releases, which scientists approve. Surprisingly, these exaggerations were not associated with more news coverage. Here we test whether these two controversial results also arise in press releases from prominent science and medical journals. We then investigate the influence of mitigating caveats in press releases, to test assumptions that caveats harm news interest or are ignored.Methods and FindingsUsing quantitative content analysis, we analyzed press releases (N = 534) on biomedical and health-related science issued by leading peer-reviewed journals. We similarly analysed the associated peer-reviewed papers (N = 534) and news stories (N = 582). Main outcome measures were advice to readers and causal statements drawn from correlational research. Exaggerations in press releases predicted exaggerations in news (odds ratios 2.4 and 10.9, 95% CIs 1.3 to 4.5 and 3.9 to 30.1) but were not associated with increased news coverage, consistent with previous findings. Combining datasets from universities and journals (996 press releases, 1250 news), we found that when caveats appeared in press releases there was no reduction in journalistic uptake, but there was a clear increase in caveats in news (odds ratios 9.6 and 9.5 for caveats for advice and causal claims, CIs 4.1 to 24.3 and 6.0 to 15.2). The main study limitation is its retrospective correlational nature.ConclusionsFor health and science news directly inspired by press releases, the main source of both exaggerations and caveats appears to be the press release itself. However we find no evidence that exaggerations increase, or caveats decrease, the likelihood of news coverage. These findings should be encouraging for press officers and scientists who wish to minimise exaggeration and include caveats in their press releases.

The underpinning assumption of much research on cognitive individual differences (or group differences) is that task performance indexes cognitive ability in that domain. In many tasks performance is measured by differences (costs) between conditions, which are widely assumed to index a psychological process of interest rather than extraneous factors such as speed–accuracy trade-offs (e.g., Stroop, implicit association task, lexical decision, antisaccade, Simon, Navon, flanker, and task switching). Relatedly, reaction time (RT) costs or error costs are interpreted similarly and used interchangeably in the literature. All of this assumes a strong correlation between RT-costs and error-costs from the same psychological effect. We conducted a meta-analysis to test this, with 114 effects across a range of well-known tasks. Counterintuitively, we found a general pattern of weak, and often no, association between RT and error costs (mean r = .17, range −.45 to .78). This general problem is accounted for by the theoretical framework of evidence accumulation models, which capture individual differences in (at least) 2 distinct ways. Differences affecting accumulation rate produce positive correlation. But this is cancelled out if individuals also differ in response threshold, which produces negative correlations. In the models, subtractions between conditions do not isolate processing costs from caution. To demonstrate the explanatory power of synthesizing the traditional subtraction method within a broader decision model framework, we confirm 2 predictions with new data. Thus, using error costs or RT costs is more than a pragmatic choice; the decision carries theoretical consequence that can be understood through the accumulation model framework.

Speed-accuracy trade-offs are often considered a confound in speeded choice tasks, but individual differences in strategy have been linked to personality and brain structure. We ask whether strategic adjustments in response caution are reliable, and whether they correlate across tasks and with impulsivity traits. In Study 1, participants performed Eriksen flanker and Stroop tasks in two sessions four weeks apart. We manipulated response caution by emphasising speed or accuracy. We fit the diffusion model for conflict tasks and correlated the change in boundary (accuracy – speed) across session and task. We observed moderate test-retest reliability, and medium to large correlations across tasks. We replicated this between-task correlation in Study 2 using flanker and perceptual decision tasks. We found no consistent correlations with impulsivity. Though moderate reliability poses a challenge for researchers interested in stable traits, consistent correlation between tasks indicates there are meaningful individual differences in the speed-accuracy trade-off.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 23(1) of (see record 2016-59631-001). In the article, the fourth author was inadvertently omitted from the advance online version. Also, the second paragraph of the author note should have included the following: "Amy Barrington contributed to the design and data collection for Experiments 2 and 3. We thank the following undergraduate students for contributions to Experiment 1 and pilot work leading up to the project: Laura Benjamin, Cecily Donnelly, Cameron Dunlop, Rebecca Emerson, Rose Fisher, Laura Jones, Olivia Manship, Hannah McCarthy, Naomi Scott, Eliza Walwyn-Jones, Leanne Whelan, and Joe Wilton." All versions of this article have been corrected.] Science-related news stories can have a profound impact on how the public make decisions. The current study presents 4 experiments that examine how participants understand scientific expressions used in news headlines. The expressions concerned causal and correlational relationships between variables (e.g., "being breast fed children behave better"). Participants rated or ranked headlines according to the extent that one variable caused the other. Our results suggest that participants differentiate between 3 distinct categories of relationship: direct cause statements (e.g., "makes," "increases"), which were interpreted as the most causal; can cause statements (e.g., "can make," "can increase"); and moderate cause statements (e.g., "might cause," "linked," "associated with"), but do not consistently distinguish within the last group despite the logical distinction between cause and association. On the basis of this evidence, we make recommendations for appropriately communicating cause and effect in news headlines. (PsycINFO Database Record

Retinal input is riddled with abrupt transients due to self-motion, changes in illumination, object-motion, etc. Our visual system must correctly interpret each of these changes to keep visual perception consistent and sensitive. This poses an enormous challenge, as many transients are highly ambiguous in that they are consistent with many alternative physical transformations. Here we investigated inter-trial effects in three situations with sudden and ambiguous transients, each presenting two alternative appearances (rotation-reversing structure-from-motion, polarity-reversing shape-from-shading, and streaming-bouncing object collisions). In every situation, we observed priming of transformations as the outcome perceived in earlier trials tended to repeat in subsequent trials and this repetition was contingent on perceptual experience. The observed priming was specific to transformations and did not originate in priming of perceptual states preceding a transient. Moreover, transformation priming was independent of attention and specific to low level stimulus attributes. In summary, we show how "transformation priors" and experience-driven updating of such priors helps to disambiguate sudden changes of sensory inputs. We discuss how dynamic transformation priors can be instantiated as "transition energies" in an "energy landscape" model of the visual perception.

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