No abstract

In the realm of global environmental governance, accountability has been key to the debate concerning pervasive environmental deterioration. Among the factors underlying this deterioration, a perceived challenge is the lack of clear mechanisms for identifying to whom the actors in environmental governance in general, and in other sectors, for example, hydropower, agricultural land, mining, and infrastructure in particular, are accountable to for their actions. To investigate the challenge of this situation, this article explores the ways in which the protest movements of grassroots communities and nongovernmental organizations endeavour to hold government and foreign corporations accountable for the actions they have taken which have contributed to environmental degradation in Cambodia. Drawing on two case studies, this article argues that these protest movements have played an increasing role in requiring environmental accountability from both government and corporations.

This study examines the dynamics and outcomes of movements by indigenous communities that targeted an agro-industrial investment demanding remedy to adverse impacts on their socio-economic conditions. Since the employment of initial institutional tactics, such as peaceful protests and petitions, yielded no significant outcomes, the indigenous communities escalated their tactics to non-institutional tactics: Violent protests. To respond, the government chose a combination of partial repression and moderate concession. To address the government responses, as well as the demands of indigenous communities, the company mitigated most of the adverse socio-economic impacts. As a result, the indigenous communities were able to achieve most of their demands. This paper, therefore, concludes by arguing that tactical escalation of indigenous community movements from institutional to non-institutional tactics influences the government and company to address the demands of indigenous communities, and also shapes the behaviour of the company operating in a host country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement.

The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sparked scholarly interest in understanding how global Chinese capital has entered and faced the unique challenges often associated with the business and regulatory environments of developing economies. Drawing on the case of Cambodia, this article seeks to understand: (i) how the new generation of overseas Chinese investors and companies, in the era of BRI, acquire licences and secure business operation in developing economies and (ii) how these investments cope with the host country’s regulatory institutions, including grassroots communities and civil society organizations. The article argues that, while the BRI’s Chinese investors have played a crucial role in the Cambodian economy, this injection of capital has co-opted and exacerbated the ambiguity of Cambodia’s regulatory environment. These Chinese investors have perpetuated the host country’s socio-political culture of patron-client networks, partly entrenched by the Sino-Cambodian elites. These networks are necessary to tap into secure investment operations, and they duly capture (and influence) regulatory institutions at the expense of marginalized communities and civil society organizations. Drawing on Cambodia’s case, the article contributes to the understanding of patron-client relations and regulatory capture in the context of socio-legal studies and the political economy of China’s global capitalism.

This study examines the dynamics and outcomes of movements by indigenous communities that targeted an agro-industrial investment demanding remedy to adverse impacts on their socio-economic conditions. Since the employment of initial institutional tactics, such as peaceful protests and petitions, yielded no significant outcomes, the indigenous communities escalated their tactics to non-institutional tactics: Violent protests. To respond, the government chose a combination of partial repression and moderate concession. To address the government responses, as well as the demands of indigenous communities, the company mitigated most of the adverse socio-economic impacts. As a result, the indigenous communities were able to achieve most of their demands. This paper, therefore, concludes by arguing that tactical escalation of indigenous community movements from institutional to non-institutional tactics influences the government and company to address the demands of indigenous communities, and also shapes the behaviour of the company operating in a host country with lax and uncertain regulatory enforcement.