Research on whistle-blowing in the Norwegian public sector shows remarkable findings compared with international research. A very high proportion of employees blow the whistle when they experience misconduct, and the majority of these people receive positive reactions. Furthermore, a majority of the whistle-blowers report that the conduct that led them to blow the whistle improved. These positive findings are different from those reported in international research displaying that whistle-blowing is difficult, often results in retaliation and is rarely effective. This article seeks to shed light on the positive Norwegian experiences, first by exploring how power resources can help us understand the extent and types of whistle-blowing, the consequences for the whistle-blower and the effectiveness of the practice. Second, the article asks whether a Norwegian model of labour relations promotes a communicative ‘culture’ where employees can freely voice their opinions and critical remarks, and report misconduct. The findings show that power resources to a little degree can explain whistle-blowing activity and its results. It is plausible to assume that the strong emphasis on collective arrangements and laws reduces the impact of an individual employee’s power resources by making the reporting process less arbitrary. Furthermore, it could be argued that the Norwegian model establishes structures for a communication culture that facilitates whistle-blowing.

There has been much recent attention to the upheavals, often externally induced, in collective bargaining and labour market regulation in southern European countries. In this article, we introduce a set of studies of changes, typically employer-driven, in collective wage regulation in northern Europe. We discuss possible drivers of change: contagion from southern Europe, regime competition among the northern countries themselves and/or destabilizing effects of east–north integration, driven by free movement. These drivers interact with internal change dynamics spurring diverging actor responses and institutional outcomes. We outline the common research design, review salient features of wage regulation in six countries, and differences in institutions, production, markets and factor mobility in four sectors. We briefly review findings from the other articles.

Norway is often praised for its flexible workforce and flexible workers, which contribute to the adaptive capacity and competitiveness of the economy. At national level, the interplay between strong welfare arrangements, active labour market policies and generous protection in the event of lay-offs also contributes to labour mobility: being laid off does not entail personal catastrophe, as unemployment benefits are universal and generous, and access to new employment is likely to come quickly, due to an active employment and labour market policy. At company level, flexible employees are characterised by their ability and willingness to combine different tasks, take on new responsibilities and use their skills in the best interests of the company. At the same time, laws and agreements secure employees against arbitrary and unfair treatment from management and colleagues. What sort of mechanisms provide for this combination of security and flexibility at company level? We argue that this security and flexibility can be attributed to the manner in which representative and individual participation interact at company level in Norway. We call it 'local flexicurity'. ❖❖❖ SommaireLa Norvège est souvent saluée pour sa main-d'oeuvre flexible et ses travailleurs flexibles, qui contribuent à la capacité d'adaptation et à la compétitivité de l'économie. Au niveau national, l'interaction entre un système fort de protection sociale, des politiques actives du marché du travail et une protection généreuse en cas de licenciement contribue également à la mobilité de la main-d'oeuvre : le licenciement n'est pas une catastrophe personnelle, puisque les prestations de chômage sont universelles et généreuses et que l'accès à un nouvel emploi a de fortes chances d'intervenir rapidement grâce une politique active de l'emploi et du marché du travail. Au niveau de l'entreprise, les salariés flexibles se caractérisent par leur capacité et leur volonté d'exécuter plusieurs tâches, d'accepter de nouvelles responsabilités et d'utiliser leurs compétences dans l'intérêt de l'entreprise. Dans le même temps, les lois et les accords protègent les salariés contre tout traitement arbitraire et injuste de la part de leur direction et de leurs collègues. Quel type de mécanismes permet une telle combinaison de sécurité et de flexibilité au niveau de l'entreprise ? Nous pensons que cette sécurité et cette flexibilité peuvent être imputées à la manière dont la participation représentative et la participation individuelle interagissent au niveau de l'entreprise en Norvège. C'est ce que nous appelons la "flexicurité locale". ❖❖❖ Zusammenfassung Norwegen wird oftmals für seine flexible Arbeitnehmerschaft und seine flexiblen Arbeitnehmer und ihren Beitrag zur Anpassungs-und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Wirtschaft gelobt. Auf nationaler Ebene trägt auch das Zusammenwirken eines gut entwickelten Wohlfahrtswesens, einer aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik und eines großzügigen Schutzes bei Entlassungen zur Mobilität der Arbeitnehmer bei: eine Entlassung ist für die Betroff...

The aim of this article is to examine the explanatory forces of power resources and institutional factors on whistle blowing activity, its effectiveness and reactions. The authors analyse survey material of 6000 Norwegian employees across sectors and industries, and find that individual power resources have little impact, but the organizational power resources of positions, and institutional factors matter. Departing from a Norwegian labour market model, this is a result that encourages continued focus on codetermination, democracy and openness.

Purpose -This paper aims to compare and contrast the approaches taken by the UK and Norway in providing employment protection for whistleblowers. Design/methodology/approach -The paper examines the legislative provisions contained in the Employment Rights Act 1996 (UK) and the Work Environment Act 2005 (Norway) together with relevant case law and preparatory papers. Findings -Unlike the UK, Norway affords employees a statutory right to notify wrongdoing and requires employers to develop internal reporting procedures. The authors believe that the approaches taken to protecting whistleblowers reflect the different systems of industrial relations in these two countries. Practical implications -In the light of this research it is suggested that a right to disclose wrongdoing should be introduced in the UK together with a duty on employers to show that it has not been infringed. It is also recommended that what can be reported should be more precisely defined in Norway either by law or collective bargaining. Originality/value -The paper makes proposals for the reform of legislation in both countries.

Whistleblowing by administrative employees in local governments can bring critical knowledge about misconduct and failed policy outcomes and priorities to the attention of politicians. This article examines whether (1) whistleblowing to politicians is considered acceptable among politicians and administrative employees, (2) politicians receive whistleblowing cases and how those who do so handle the case, and (3) contact patterns between politicians and administrative employees influence the whistleblowing activity and the action taken by the politicians to address wrongdoing. The article departs from the theory of pillars of institutions and the tensions between and within institutional pillars to analyse unique data from a survey based on the vignette method and actual whistleblowing among politicians (N 5 400) and employees (N 5 373) from 20 Norwegian municipalities. The analysis shows that the degree of contact between politicians and administrative employees is correlated with positive perceptions of whistleblowing and constructive handling of wrongdoing reports by the politicians.

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Industrial cleaning shares some common features across countries. Institutions for collective wage regulation are fragile, the market is highly price-sensitive and skewed competition has exerted pressure on wages and conditions. Increased cross-border mobility of labour and enterprises after EU enlargement brought new sources of competitive pressure, which was amplified by the subsequent economic crisis. We study changes in collective regulation in industrial cleaning in Denmark, Germany, Norway and the UK since the turn of the century, and find that the social partners have responded differently to the challenges. We discuss these responses in the light of national differences in industrial relations regimes and the regulatory tools available for the organized actors.