We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur

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The increase in distributed generation and the pro-active role of consumers call for smarter networks. Consequently, regulation must change to promote this evolution. This article performs a critical overview of the Italian regulation of electricity distribution and its effectiveness in encouraging efficiency, quality and innovative investments. The analysis shows that the regulator has followed a building-block approach: throughout different regulatory periods, it has added new modules to its previous regulatory mechanism to take care of the constantly increasing set of objectives. This does not give DSOs a unitary and coherent regulatory framework and has led to the overlapping of different incentive mechanisms.

The centrality of institutional determinants for economic performance has recently flourished in the economic policy debate. 'Doing Business' is a project launched in 2004 by the World Bank with the aim of providing objective measures of business regulation and enforcement across the world. Several legal and economic scholars have questioned the reliability of Doing Business indicators, the methodology and the theoretical background. We discuss the main critics raised and the potential of the World Bank project towards the economic analysis of comparative law.