Over the last 50 years, we argue that incentives for academic scientists have become increasingly perverse in terms of competition for research funding, development of quantitative metrics to measure performance, and a changing business model for higher education itself. Furthermore, decreased discretionary funding at the federal and state level is creating a hypercompetitive environment between government agencies (e.g., EPA, NIH, CDC), for scientists in these agencies, and for academics seeking funding from all sources—the combination of perverse incentives and decreased funding increases pressures that can lead to unethical behavior. If a critical mass of scientists become untrustworthy, a tipping point is possible in which the scientific enterprise itself becomes inherently corrupt and public trust is lost, risking a new dark age with devastating consequences to humanity. Academia and federal agencies should better support science as a public good, and incentivize altruistic and ethical outcomes, while de-emphasizing output.

In April 2014, the drinking water source in Flint, Michigan was switched from Lake Huron water with phosphate inhibitors to Flint River water without corrosion inhibitors. The absence of corrosion control and use of a more corrosive source increased lead leaching from plumbing. Our city-wide citizen science water lead results contradicted official claims that there was no problem- our 90th percentile was 26.8 μg/L, which was almost double the Lead and Copper Rule action level of 15 μg/L. Back calculations of a LCR sampling pool with 50% lead pipes indicated an estimated 90th percentile lead value of 31.7 μg/L (±4.3 μg/L). Four subsequent sampling efforts were conducted to track reductions in water lead after the switch back to Lake Huron water and enhanced corrosion control. The incidence of water lead varied by service line material. Between August 2015 and November 2016, median water lead reduced from 3.0 to <1 μg/L for homes with copper service lines, 7.2-1.9 μg/L with galvanized service lines, and 9.9-2.3 μg/L with lead service lines. As of summer 2017, our 90th percentile of 7.9 μg/L no longer differed from official results, which indicated Flint's water lead levels were below the action level.

No abstract

No abstract

A citizen science collaboration between Flint residents, the Virginia Tech "Flint Water Study" team, and others helped to uncover the Flint Lead-in-Drinking Water Crisis and a community-wide outbreak of Legionella. The resulting Federal Emergency declaration in January 2016 resulted in more than $600 million in relief funding, an acknowledged case of environmental injustice, and resignations/indictments of some public officials. But after responsible government entities apologized and attempted to make amends and help with the recovery, some "citizen scientists" began making public statements that were in direct conflict with public health messaging of scientific authorities. A general state of science anarchy resulted, which created further distrust and confusion. Some practices employed were consistent with a concept of "citizen engineering," which aims to "undermine engineering [and science] expertise" in the name of "democratizing" science. "Citizen Engineers" view concepts of scientific rigor and objectivity as justification for abuse of power by authorities and scientists, and they embrace biases and conflicts of interest that scientists aspire to guard against. While there are ethical guidelines for professional scientists on research misconduct, no such framework exists for policing instances of unethical behavior by citizen scientists. Possible abuses of citizen science documented in Flint explored in this case study include: 1) collection of non-representative data that created unjustified fear among residents about the safety of water used for bathing and showering, 2) perceived financial conflicts of interest, and 3) falsification of data to obtain relief resources, support lawsuits, gain media attention, or support erroneous scientific conclusions. We also report the journey of an aspiring citizen scientist who openly acknowledged mistakes, made the "right" decision in relation to handling an ethical dilemma, and who was then publicly attacked for doing so. This experience highlights challenges to the practice of citizen science, especially during high profile emergency interventions and disasters involving environmental injustice.

Erosion or velocity-induced copper pipe corrosion is a significant problem in potable water systems, especially hot water recirculation systems. The little scientific work done in freshwater has not always been able to scientifically isolate the key factors causing these failures; in fact, most existing recommendations rely on anecdotal and/or experiential knowledge from forensic analysis of field failures, which are not confirmed by complementary laboratory research. Consequently, this comprehensive review summarizes prior observations that include mechanical and electrochemical attack induced by water chemistry, temperature, velocity, hydrodynamic conditions, presence of particulate matter, and other variables thought to influence/exacerbate erosion corrosion. Distinct phenomena thought to contribute to erosion corrosion or “flow-induced failure”, including concentration cell corrosion, cavitation, particle/bubble impingement, and high velocity impingement, are explored in detail along with conventional erosion corrosion testing methods. Existing recommendations to prevent erosion corrosion in copper pipes are evaluated and inconsistencies in available guidelines are examined.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency mandates that community water systems (or water utilities) provide annual consumer confidence reports (CCRs)--water quality reports--to their consumers. These reports encapsulate information regarding sources of water, detected contaminants, regulatory compliance, and educational material. These reports have excellent potential for providing the public with accurate information on the safety of tap water, but there is a lack of research on the degree to which the information can be understood by a large proportion of the population. This study evaluated the readability of a nationally representative sample of 30 CCRs, released between 2011 and 2013. Readability (or 'comprehension difficulty') was evaluated using Flesch-Kincaid readability tests. The analysis revealed that CCRs were written at the 11th-14th grade level, which is well above the recommended 6th-7th grade level for public health communications. The CCR readability ease was found to be equivalent to that of the Harvard Law Review journal. These findings expose a wide chasm that exists between current water quality reports and their effectiveness toward being understandable to US residents. Suggestions for reorienting language and scientific information in CCRs to be easily comprehensible to the public are offered.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency mandates that community water systems (CWSs), or drinking water utilities, provide annual consumer confidence reports (CCRs) reporting on water quality, compliance with regulations, source water, and consumer education. While certain report formats are prescribed, there are no criteria ensuring that consumers understand messages in these reports. To assess clarity of message, trained raters evaluated a national sample of 30 CCRs using the Centers for Disease Control Clear Communication Index (Index) indices: (1) Main Message/Call to Action; (2) Language; (3) Information Design; (4) State of the Science; (5) Behavioral Recommendations; (6) Numbers; and (7) Risk. Communication materials are considered qualifying if they achieve a 90% Index score. Overall mean score across CCRs was 50 ± 14% and none scored 90% or higher. CCRs did not differ significantly by water system size. State of the Science (3 ± 15%) and Behavioral Recommendations (77 ± 36%) indices were the lowest and highest, respectively. Only 63% of CCRs explicitly stated if the water was safe to drink according to federal and state standards and regulations. None of the CCRs had passing Index scores, signaling that CWSs are not effectively communicating with their consumers; thus, the Index can serve as an evaluation tool for CCR effectiveness and a guide to improve water quality communications.