Low agricultural water fee collection rates are a problem commonly faced by many developing countries and this is a problem faced by China as it enters the new century. There are two main problem-solving strategies used in different areas of China: increasing the water fee collection rate, or exempting people from paying the water fee. In those areas where the first strategy is pursued, local governments adopt multiple measures to improve collection rates, such as introducing water user associations and enhancing the transparency of irrigation management. Exempting people from paying a water fee is a new strategy, adapted to China's rapid economic growth and social transition. In those areas that are exempting people from paying water fees, the financial sustainability of irrigation facilities has to be taken seriously and new farmer-level water-saving mechanisms need to be explored. In this paper, China's agricultural water fee collection dilemma is analysed from both a practical and a theoretical perspective. It is argued that China should not simply adopt a single agricultural water fee collection model and that each local government should explore policies that are appropriate for the local situation.
It is well known that public agencies are nearly immortal, but what explains their termination? This article argues that apart from conventional antecedents, political salience defined by top leaders largely shapes government agencies' life cycle. In one of the first large‐N analyses of agency termination in a non‐Western authoritarian regime, we used longitudinal data for the central apparatus in China from 1949 to 1976 to test this hypothesis. We specifically used Chairman Mao's written directives to measure political salience and found that agencies that received more directives were less likely to be terminated. In contrast, agencies less attended to the boss were less likely to survive major restructurings. We also found that peripheral agencies (e.g., smaller, lower‐ranking agencies with noncore functions) benefited more from leaders' attention. We compare the results with the existing literature and suggest some theoretical and policy implications.
Two types of farmer-level mechanisms have been traditionally adopted to increase agricultural water use efficiency in northern China: pricing mechanisms and tradable water rights systems. However, the reluctance of policymakers to exacerbate farmers' burdens has rendered pricing mechanisms politically infeasible, while tradable water rights systems involve prohibitively high transaction costs in rural China. An experiment conducted in 2005 in the Taocheng District of Hebei Province created a new kind of water-saving mechanism that involves a number of institutional innovations, including "flexible total management", "collect then refund" and "collect and subsidize, then refund". This paper evaluates the district's water-saving mechanisms based on efficiency, equity and operability criteria. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the "collect then refund" mechanism can more effectively enhance water use efficiency and reduce farmers' burdens than water pricing instruments, tradable water rights systems and flexible total management. Adequate infrastructure and trusted institutions are identified as necessary prerequisites for the successful implementation of the new water-saving mechanism. We believe the new mechanism has great potential to be scaled up.
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