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In many countries governments are recruiting the medical profession into a more active, transparent regulation of clinical practice. Consequently the medical profession adapts the ways it regulates itself and its relationship to health system managers changes. This paper uses empirical research in English Primary Care Groups (PCGs) and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to assess the value of Courpasson's concept of soft bureaucracy as a conceptualisation of these changes. Clinical governance in PCGs and PCTs displays important parallels with governance in soft bureaucracies, but the concept of soft bureaucracy requires modification to make it more applicable to general practice. In English primary care, governance over rank-and-file doctors is exercised by local professional leaders rather than general managers, harnessing their colleagues' perception of threats to professional autonomy and self-regulation rather than fears of competition as the means of 'soft coercion'.Keywords: Soft bureaucracy, primary care, professions, clinical governance, networks, England, NHS Professions and soft bureaucracyFor many years European governments have tried to collaborate with, indeed co-opt, professional networks as one means of managing public services and implementing public policy (Harrison and Dowswell 2002). Their strategy is to develop workable coalitions between general ( i.e. lay) managers and leaders of the profession, thereby minimising practitioner opposition but still maintaining the principles of general management (Thompson

Objectives: To investigate the concept of clinical governance being advocated by primary care groups/trusts (PCG/Ts), approaches being used to implement clinical governance, and potential barriers to its successful implementation in primary care. Design: Qualitative case studies using semi-structured interviews and documentation review. Setting: Twelve purposively sampled PCG/Ts in England. Participants: Fifty senior staff including chief executives, clinical governance leads, mental health leads, and lay board members. Main outcome measures: Participants' perceptions of the role of clinical governance in PCG/Ts. Results: PCG/Ts recognise that the successful implementation of clinical governance in general practice will require cultural as well as organisational changes, and the support of practices. They are focusing their energies on supporting practices and getting them involved in quality improvement activities. These activities include, but move beyond, conventional approaches to quality assessment (audit, incentives) to incorporate approaches which emphasise corporate and shared learning. PCG/Ts are also engaged in setting up systems for monitoring quality and for dealing with poor performance. Barriers include structural barriers (weak contractual levers to influence general practices), resource barriers (perceived lack of staff or money), and cultural barriers (suspicion by practice staff or problems overcoming the perceived blame culture associated with quality assessment). Conclusion: PCG/Ts are focusing on setting up systems for implementing clinical governance which seek to emphasise developmental and supportive approaches which will engage health professionals. Progress is intentionally incremental but formidable challenges lie ahead, not least reconciling the dual role of supporting practices while monitoring (and dealing with poor) performance.

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