Quantum computing on encrypted data allows a client who has limited quantum capacity to delegate his or her private computation to an untrusted quantum server, meanwhile the input and output are encrypted by the quantum one-time pad and only the client can correctly decrypt them. Generally, the client is required to have ability to prepare some single qubits and perform some basic gates. In this work, we consider a further restricted situation where the client can only prepare one single qubit and perform one basic gate. Specifically, we show that as long as the client can prepare a fixed qubit |+〉 and perform a fixed phase gate P, then he or she can still achieve the secure delegated quantum computation. Besides, our protocol can provide a more rigorous security for any quantum computation. For example, even if some encryption keys about the computation are leaked, it can still guarantee the privacy of the input and output. Finally, our protocol experimentally has a great significance in reducing the device complexity of the client’s side.

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In this paper, we propose a distributed secure delegated quantum computation protocol, by which an almost classical client can delegate a (dk)-qubit quantum circuit to d quantum servers, where each server is equipped with a 2k-qubit register that is used to process only k qubits of the delegated quantum circuit. None of servers can learn any information about the input and output of the computation. The only requirement for the client is that he or she has ability to prepare four possible qubits in the state of (|0⟩+eiθ|1⟩)/2, where θ∈{0,π/2,π,3π/2}. The only requirement for servers is that each pair of them share some entangled states (|0⟩|+⟩+|1⟩|−⟩)/2 as ancillary qubits. Instead of assuming that all servers are interconnected directly by quantum channels, we introduce a third party in our protocol that is designed to distribute the entangled states between those servers. This would simplify the quantum network because the servers do not need to share a quantum channel. In the end, we show that our protocol can guarantee unconditional security of the computation under the situation where all servers, including the third party, are honest-but-curious and allowed to cooperate with each other.

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Verification in quantum computations is crucial since quantum systems are extremely vulnerable to the environment. However, verifying directly the output of a quantum computation is difficult since we know that efficiently simulating a large-scale quantum computation on a classical computer is usually thought to be impossible. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a self-testing system for quantum computations, which can be used to verify if a quantum computation is performed correctly by itself. Our basic idea is using some extra ancilla qubits to test the output of the computation. We design two kinds of permutation circuits into the original quantum circuit: one is applied on the ancilla qubits whose output indicates the testing information, the other is applied on all qubits (including ancilla qubits) which is aiming to uniformly permute the positions of all qubits. We show that both permutation circuits are easy to achieve. By this way, we prove that any quantum computation has an efficient self-testing system. In the end, we also discuss the relation between our self-testing system and interactive proof systems, and show that the two systems are equivalent if the verifier is allowed to have some quantum capacity.