The prevalence of opportunistic behaviors in agri-food production and circulation results in frequent quality accidents in emerging economies. Numerous researches have discussed effective countermeasures to this problem, but few of them focus on the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems. Owing to the bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the dynamic quality game among producers, marketers, and consumers has significant characteristics of complexity. This paper aims at discussing the farmer-supermarket direct purchase's contributions to ensure the agri-food quality and analyzing the effectiveness, stability, and key factors of this new industrial organization. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we establish the trilateralgame payoff matrix, build up the replicator dynamic equations, and discuss possible evolutionary stable states. The simulation results show that the evolutionary system converges to desired stability faster, when the high-quality agri-food's market premium increases and the penalty for violating quality standards increases. Furthermore, when farmers share more high-quality agri-food's market premiums and marketers compensate more for violating the quality standards than before, the evolutionary system also converges to desired stability faster. Therefore, the quality information tracing technology, farmers and marketers' fair distribution of profits and risks, and consumers' capabilities to safeguard their legal rights are the three key factors to maintain the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems.

In this paper, a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly model with market share preference is established. Assume that there is a degree of product difference between the two firms, where one firm takes the price as a decision variable and the other takes the quantity. Both firms are bounded rational, with linear cost functions and demand functions. The stability of the equilibrium points is analyzed, and the effects of some parameters (α, β, d and v) on the model stability are studied. Basins of attraction are investigated and the evolution process is shown with the increase in the output adjustment speed. The simulation results show that instability will lead to the increase in the average utility of the firm that determines the quantity and reduce the average utility of the firm that determines price.

This paper studies a dual-channel apparel supply chain faced with strategic consumers and uncertain demands, where the dominant retailer decides its service level and offline price first, and the manufacturer decides the online price later on. This paper develops a framework to examine the impacts of quick response on the system’s short-term profitability and long-term stability. To make comparisons, two scenarios are considered, in which the supply chain system adopts and does not adopt quick response, respectively. The optimal decisions and profits of the firms are first analyzed in two scenarios, and dynamic game models are then developed to study the complex characteristics. Comparisons in supply chain outputs and system stability are further made between these two scenarios. The results show that the imbalance of risks in two channels affects the performance of quick response that tends to benefit the retailer more, while it benefits the manufacturer only when the return rate is extremely high and consumers care much about the purchase channels. However, quick response certainly contributes to the system stability, which not only provides a larger stable region for firms to adjust their decisions, but also makes the system less sensitive to the consumers’ valuation for the product. Along with this, it is easier for the chaotic system with quick response to restore the stability.

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