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Political theorists sometimes advocate the intensification of citizens' participation in politics, on the grounds that this serves as an engine for the cultivation of social solidarity and civic virtue. I argue against such an initiative and set out the case for a more nuanced examination of the effect of particular modes of political participation on social solidarity, in light of recent empirical literature. Against the assertions of the theorists in question, the research reveals that political participation per se does not cultivate the said virtues, whereas entrusting citizens with deliberating and deciding specific policy issues (specifically in the form of citizens' juries or CJs) does. Finally, it is argued that there is a rather limited scope to the implementation of deliberative bodies of the kind that cultivates solidarity. Consequently, intensifying political participation is not a reliable means through which social solidarity can be cultivated.

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Stuart White and others claim that providing welfare benefits to citizens who do not, and are not willing to, work breaches the principle of reciprocity. This, they argue, justifies placing a minimum work requirement on welfare recipients. This article seeks to rebut their claim. It begins by rejecting the attempt to ground the work requirement on a civic obligation to work. The article then explores the principle of reciprocity, and argues that the practice of reciprocity depends on the particular conception of distributive justice adopted. An examination of different interpretations of egalitarian justice and their corresponding patterns of reciprocity demonstrates that unconditional welfare benefits are compatible with, and sometimes even warranted by, the principle of reciprocity. Thus, imposing a work requirement on welfare recipients is by no means a mandate of reciprocity.

In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of (some of) its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes on to show, cannot do so while availing themselves of the leveling down objection (LDO) to egalitarianism. They may not do so because similarly to egalitarianism, prioritarianism also must reject the principle of personal good. That is, egalitarians and prioritarians may sometime recommend certain actions and outcomes even when these are better for no one. Prioritarians may survive the Otsuka–Voorhoeve critique, but to do so they must abandon their anti-egalitarian stance (or at the very least, the LDO).