This paper analyses the effects of investment in information technologies (IT) in the banking sector using bank-level data from a panel of 68 US banks over the period 1986-2005. Although IT can improve bank's performance by reducing operational cost (supply side), it can bring in competition among banks in order to embrace new technology (demand side). Since most empirical studies have adopted the production function approach, it is difficult to identify which effect has dominated. In a differentiated model with network effects, this paper characterizes the conditions to identify these two effects. The results suggest that (at individual firm levels) the bank profits can decline due to adoption and diffusion of IT investment, reflecting negative network competition effects in this industry. Using panel cointegration tests, we confirm that the estimated profit equation is indeed a long-run equilibrium relation.

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This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage‐free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue‐sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.

We describe a double agency problem in firms' charitable donations. When managers have better knowledge about the effectiveness of donations and their altruistic preferences, it is difficult for shareholders to tell whether charitable donations are made for a strategic purpose or due to managerial altruism. We characterize the equilibrium donations in a heterogeneous competition model. We show that managerial altruism is a substitute for the effectiveness of donations, and excess donations cannot be prevented by a compensation scheme that reduces the interest conflicts between ownership and management. Under board authorization, the board will tolerate donations with high effectiveness and low altruism as well as donations corresponding to low effectiveness and high altruism. Under a penalty scheme, the altruistic manager will increase donations, in order to increase donation's strategic benefit to compensate for the loss from the penalty.