Metal-organic complexes assembled from coordinative interactions are known to be able to display a wide range of photoluminescent behaviors benefiting from an extensive number of metal ions, organic linkers, and inclusion guests, depending on the multifaceted nature of their chemical structures and photophysical properties. In the past two decades, the white-light-emitting (WLE) and photoluminescent color-tuning (PLCT) materials based on the single-phase metal-organic coordination assemblies have merited particular attention and gained substantial advances. In this review, we give an overview of recent progress in this field, placing emphasis on the WLE and PLCT properties realized in the single-phase materials, which covers the origin, generation, and manipulation of different types of photoluminescence (PL) derived from ligand-centered (LC), metal/cluster-centered (MC or CC), excimer/exciplex-based (EX), metal-to-ligand or ligand-to-metal charge-transfer-based (MLCT or LMCT), or guest-included emissions. The coordination assemblies in this topic can be generally classified into three categories [(1) mono/homometallic coordination assemblies based on main group (s,p-block), transition (d-block), or lanthanide (f-block) metal centers, (2) s/p-f-, d-f-, or f-f-type heterometallic coordination assemblies, and (3) guest-included coordination assemblies] for which WLE and PLCT properties can be achieved by virtue of either a wide-band/overlapped emission covering the whole visible spectrum from a single emitting center or a combination of complementary color emissions from multiple emitting centers/origins. Some state-of-the-art assembly methods and successful design models relevant to the above three categories are elaborated to demonstrate how to achieve efficient and controllable white-light emission in a single-phase material through a tunable PL approach. Potential applications in the fields of lighting and displaying, sensing and detecting, and barcoding and patterning are surveyed, and at the end, possible prospects and challenges for future development along this line are proposed.
We consider the security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution implementation with the local oscillator (LO) fluctuating in time, which opens a loophole for Eve to intercept the secret key. We show that Eve can simulate this fluctuation to hide her Gaussian collective attack by reducing the intensity of the LO. Numerical simulations demonstrate that, if Bob does not monitor the LO intensity and does not scale his measurements with the instantaneous intensity values of LO, the secret key rate will be compromised severely.
Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is a standard technique in current quantum cryptographic implementations. Unfortunately, existing experiments have two important drawbacks: the state preparation is assumed to be perfect without errors and the employed security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. These two drawbacks mean that existing experiments are not guaranteed to be secure in practice. Here, we perform an experiment that for the first time shows secure QKD with imperfect state preparations over long distances and achieves rigorous finite-key security bounds for decoy-state QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. We quantify the source flaws experimentally and demonstrate a QKD implementation that is tolerant to channel loss despite the source flaws. Our implementation considers more real-world problems than most previous experiments and our theory can be applied to general QKD systems. These features constitute a step towards secure QKD with imperfect devices.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures, updated experiment and theor
We present the wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system with a heterodyne protocol, in which the transmittance of beam splitters at Bob's station is wavelength-dependent. Our strategy is proposed independent of but analogous to that of Huang et al. [arXiv: 1206.6550v1 [quant-ph]], but in that paper the shot noise of the two beams that Eve sends to Bob, transmitting after the homodyne detector, is unconsidered. However, shot noise is the main contribution to the deviation of Bob's measurements from Eve's when implementing the wavelength attack, so it must be considered accurately. In this paper, we firstly analyze the solutions of the equations specifically that must be satisfied in this attack, which is not considered rigorously by Huang et al. Then we calculate the shot noise of the homodyne detector accurately and conclude that the wavelength attack can be implemented successfully in some parameter regime.
The Faraday mirror (FM) plays a very important role in maintaining the stability of two-way plug-and-play quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. However, the practical FM is imperfect, which will not only introduce an additional quantum bit error rate (QBER) but also leave a loophole for Eve to spy the secret key. In this paper we propose a passive Faraday mirror attack in two-way QKD system based on the imperfection of FM. Our analysis shows that if the FM is imperfect, the dimension of Hilbert space spanned by the four states sent by Alice is three instead of two. Thus Eve can distinguish these states with a set of Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) operators belonging to three-dimension space, which will reduce the QBER induced by her attack. Furthermore, a relationship between the degree of the imperfection of FM and the transmittance of the practical QKD system is obtained. The results show that the probability that Eve loads her attack successfully depends on the degree of the imperfection of FM rapidly, but the QBER induced by Eve's attack changes slightly with the degree of the FM imperfection.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), leaving the detection procedure to the third partner and thus being immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is very promising for the construction of high-security quantum information networks. We propose a scheme to implement MDI-QKD, but with continuous variables instead of discrete ones, i.e., with the source of Gaussian-modulated coherent states, based on the principle of continuous-variable entanglement swapping. This protocol not only can be implemented with current telecom components but also has high key rates compared to its discrete counterpart; thus it will be highly compatible with quantum networks.
Quantum key distribution is a matured quantum science and technology. Over the last 20 years, there has been substantial research and development in this area. Recently, silicon technology has offered tremendous promise in the field for improved miniaturization of quantum key distribution through integrated photonic chips. We expect further progress in this area both in terms of protocols, photon sources, and photon detectors. This review captures some of the recent advances in this area.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distribution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement unit, which is regarded as the "Achilles' heel" of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show theoretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.
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