This study extends prior studies by examining how managerial ownership and external unrelated blockholdings affect the informativeness of earnings. The results are in contrast to prior studies. A non-linear relation exists between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness increases with managerial ownership at low levels but not at higher levels of managerial ownership where the entrenchment effect sets in. Consistent with the role of large shareholder monitoring, the evidence shows a strong positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings informativeness. These results are supported when income-increasing and absolute discretionary accruals are used to measure the extent of earnings management Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.

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We examine the role of strategic interaction in explaining the valuation effect of new product announcements and employ Sundaram, John, and John's (1996) competitive strategy measure to operationalize the nature of a firm's competitive interaction. Using a sample of new product introductions between 1991 and 1995, we find that the market values introductions announced by firms in strategic substitutes competition more favorably than those announced by firms in strategic complements competition. These results hold after we control for other variables that could explain the announcement effect. We also find that industry rivals of those announcing firms that compete in strategic substitutes and experience a positive announcement effect generally suffer a small, but significant wealth loss. The evidence supports the notion that the nature of competitive interaction in an industry is important in assessing the effect of corporate product strategies on shareholder value. Previous studies show that announcements of new product strategies are generally associated with a positive effect on shareholder value (

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